All right. Back on the record. All parties are again present. Mr. Regwan, Mr. Schwartz, you have 10 minutes to respond. Also, if you would, slow down a little, please.

Thank you, your Honor. First, I'd like to address what I consider to be an unprofessional swipe at me. Mr. Mirell said that I cited the Dix case against the business and professions code. The Dix case was vacated on other grounds, and I cited dicta which represents the law as it is today. And I'd like to read that portion that I cited in my brief. "A person who is not a party to a criminal action has no standing to appear in the action unless a right in such party has been constitutionally or statutorily created." That's the law as it is today and I just cited from dicta from that case. Now, Mr. Mirell also said that I didn't address the issue of what happens when something becomes a part of the public record. But I did in my moving papers. He apparently missed it. It's on page 20. I cited the case called in re Alexander case:

"Persuasive authority that reasoned that while the public has a right of access to pleadings, docket entries, orders, et cetera, this right does not extend to information gathered in the discovery process not made a part of the public record." So the issue is, what portions of my client's materials have been made a part of the public record. Arguably, only the Defendant's proffer that has been read into the record. That's only five percent of my client's material. There's other material that has been acquired in the discovery process, but has not been read into the record, has not been made a part of the public record. In fact, it was protected by a protective order and properly so. And so the public doesn't have a right to this. And we heard a lot of passionate arguments about what the public has a right. They have to know. They have to know. But what authority has anybody cited saying they have the right to know what's in my client's proprietary materials. I haven't heard that. The public wants to know a lot of things. The public wants to know who shot J.F. Kennedy, but they're not entitled to know that yet. The public wants to know the name of rape victims in several cases, but they don't know that. The public probably wants to know what transpired in private conversations on the Defense's side of the table and they probably want to know what transpired in private conversations on the Prosecution's side of the table, and even though the Prosecution represents the People, the People will never find out what transpired in those conversations. They can't know. There are sealed proceedings that--in this case that the People will never find out about because they're sealed. And this is just another example of another thing that the public does not have a right to know, my client's proprietary property. And if you take the ACLU's argument to its logical extreme, they can come in here with their taxpayer status for standing and argue that the public has a right to know how Mrs. McKinny decorates her home and so that they can march into her house and start taking pictures off the wall because the public has a right to know. That's absurd. Yet that's what they're trying to do with my client's proprietary information in which she does enjoy copyright protection. And this seems to me to be the tyranny of majority. Everybody is coming in here claiming that they have a right to know and based on that because everybody is in agreement, my client has to forfeit 10 years of intense creative labor. And the other argument that the ACLU put forth, which is kind of ridiculous, is this idea that it's going to leak anyway. This leakage is going to happen. We all know it, so why don't we just get it over with and turn over the whole thing. Well, I guess if somebody is dying of cancer, we should shoot them in the head since they're going to die anyway. I mean, forget about trying to cure cancer. And, of course, they're saying that by lifting the copyright--by lifting the protective order, the court would not be engendering a copyright infringement. But really, what the court would be doing is putting my client's information on a silver platter and ring the dinner bell for everybody else in the world to attack it and distribute it and reproduce it in whatever form they so desire. And if I may just come up with a creative metaphor to illustrate the point. If I were to take a rabbit by the ears and drop it in a rattlesnake tank and turn around and say, well, I didn't kill the rabbit, the snakes killed the rabbit, we all know that would be wrong because I killed the rabbit by dropping it into the tank. And by lifting the protective order, the court would effectively be killing the rabbit because they're putting it out there for everybody to attack and to use without my client's permission. And let's talk about Mr. Fuhrman's words for a second. They are still claiming that my client doesn't have a right to those words. Well, she doesn't have a right to his words, but she has a right to the sounds that she transfixed into this medium of expression called an audiotape. She does have a right to that. And we--although we fervently contend that Mr. Fuhrman does not have a right in his answers that were recorded on tape, I'd like to point out that Mr. Fuhrman entered into a contract with my client where he would get $10,000 in exchange for doing all this. And so he forfeited whatever rights he had in favor of my client. And they said that my eminent domain argument was ridiculous. But if this court sees fit to completely devalue my client's property by setting it up on this silver platter, of course, that's a taking. And to the extent that the ACLU says that's not a taking, we know now what ACLU really stands for. Another constitutional law undermined. And let's talk about authorship for a second. Let's take two famous cases of authorship. Abraham Zepruder caught the Kennedy assassination on film. Fortuitously, he was standing on a hill and he filmed the assassination. He caught that on film. Now, he doesn't have a right to stop people from reenacting the assassination, but he certainly has a right to that film, and he sold it to time magazine.

And George Holiday, when he videotaped the Rodney King beating, he didn't participate in the beatings himself. He didn't tell the police what to do. He just ran outside and taped it. And he has a copyright in his videotape. And now with the Fuhrman tapes, my client, unlike the holiday case and unlike Abraham Zepruder, my client overtly participated in that conversation. Mr. Fuhrman would not have uttered those words if it wasn't for my client's questions. She actively participated in that and skillfully elicited that information and recorded it. And the recording is where you have authorship. It's not the fact that he said it. It's that she caught it on tape. And she is an author simply by virtue of the fact that she flipped on her tape recorder. If I took a picture of this courtroom, I would have a copyright in that picture.

Slow down.

And likewise, when she started her tape recorder, a copyright interest was created immediately therein. I'll address the city's argument for standing. They may have a standing because they need to conduct this investigation. But the question is, do they have standing in this proceeding. And they don't. And, in fact, no charges have been filed against anybody. And if they need information for an investigation for charges, then I understand that. But still, they need to go to a grand jury and get an indictment or something. No charges were filed based on the Fuhrman's tapes. And they need to initiate their own proceeding, and they do have subpoena power in another action, and we'll handle it and we'll take it up at that proceeding, and they've actually served that subpoena. And so they don't need this court to do that in. I think that they're trying to use this court because we otherwise might be able to avert--raise the Shield Law which Mr. Simpson could overcome, but they can't overcome that. And we contend that we haven't waived any protections afforded by the Shield Law because of the protective order. We--the information was used as far as it was needed for the Simpson case, but to the extent it could be used for something outside this case and unrelated to this case, for example, an investigation, she is still entitled to invoke that Shield Law. We--the city says that it would pose an administrative burden on them if they were to have to continually come back to our office to conduct their meaningful investigation. But I'm aware of no authority which purports to be a law of convenience allowing a governmental entity to subrogate the property rights of my client just so they can make life easier on their employees. My client has property rights that have to be respected, and we're sorry that it may cause an inconvenience to anybody, but that inconvenience doesn't give them the right to come in and demand wholesale copies of my client's materials. And they argue that it wouldn't be a copyright infringement for the city to have these materials because they're not going to be distributing them and they're not going to be reproducing them. But it would be a copyright infringement for the court to give a copy to them because that infringes on my client's right to distribution. Even if it's just one copy to one person, my client has a right to do that. The court doesn't have the right to do that. The court has the absolute right to use my client's copies of her work for these proceedings, as it has ably done. But for matters that are outside the scope of this proceeding, the court has no authority to start giving copies of my client's work to anybody who comes in here and demands that. Also, I don't know how much more of an investigation with regard to my client's tapes is necessary for the city. I mean, they've already heard everything that's on there. They pretty much got the gist of it. As I said before, they're welcome to come back. But a meaningful investigation can be accomplished at this point by using that information now. Go ask Mr. Fuhrman some questions. Go ask the victims of these alleged incidents of police misconduct. Open Mr. Fuhrman's files, which I understand are sealed and sent off to Sacramento. I mean, there's a lot of things they can do now for that investigation. They don't need my client's tapes anymore. They can use that information that they've already garnered. If they need to come back, they continue to look at it, that's fine. But they can show the public that they've already started their investigation. We will continue to help because we realize this is an important thing, and then they can start with the rest of their investigation. They don't need to have a copy of my client's materials. And unless the court wants me to address any other issue, then I would again just pray that the court respect the protective order which was properly enacted. I guess if I may, I'll just address why the court's protective order was proper.

Okay.

All right.

The local rule was brought up by the ACLU, 7.19, saying that we have to satisfy three requirements for the protective order. The first requirement is that secrecy is in the public interest. The second requirement is that my client would have to have a cognizable interest in the materials, and, third, that serious harm with result from a public disclosure. Secrecy is in the public interest, your Honor, because to protect these materials would protect the reasoning behind the copyright law in total and the Shield Law, because for the copyright--the copyright law was enacted to give authors a monopoly on their work, to give them an incentive to keep creating. That's why we granted it. And if we don't respect that monopoly, if we don't respect that protection, then the public's interest in promoting the arts and sciences will be derogated. We want to protect this copyright so that we can send a message to all other authors that, "Hey, you will be protected if you create your works." The second factor, that my client has a cognizable interest in the materials, I mean, even the ACLU have all but conceded that at least my client has a right to her spoken words, and that's about half of what's on the tapes. And this tape recording or these tape recordings are not indivisible works. Excuse me. They aren't divisible works. It is an indivisible work. You cannot just go through there and redact one person's words. This is one unit, and my client owns it. And the third factor is that serious harm will result from a public disclosure and serious harm would result from a public disclosure at this time without my client's permission, and that would be, of course, the complete devaluation of 10 years' worth of creative intent and physical labor. And for that reason, your Honor, the court's issuance of the protective order was completely proper and it should not be undermined at this point. And so again, unless the court wants me to address another issue that it is still considering, I would ask the court to uphold the protective order and to deny the motions of these nonparties.

All right. Thank you very much, counsel.

Thank you.

All right. Let's shift gears. Counsel, I'm going to take the matter under submission. It's not a matter that I need to address immediately. I do need to get my rebuttal case underway. So you can anticipate a ruling sometime next week. All right. Thank you, counsel.

Thank you, your Honor.