Needless to say, I am not at all familiar with the proceedings which I will now preside over, but for I have read and considered a Defendant's motion for statements given a witness in the course of an Internal Affairs investigation filed August 1st and a motion by the city attorney on behalf of the Los Angeles Police Department to quash Defendant's motion--strike that--to quash the Defendant's subpoena duces tecum, which I have not seen. So other than that, I have read and considered nothing. Who on behalf of Mr. Simpson will be addressing the issues before this Judge?
Arthur Walsh, assistant city attorney, your Honor. Would you like me to give the Court a copy of the subpoena duces tecum at this point?
That would be helpful. And as that's being given to me, Mr. Uelmen, in your motion filed August the 1st, it appears not to be in response to the SDT, but rather a request for discovery?
Yes, your Honor. I believe the subpoena has actually been mooted. We believe we're entitled to this in the course of discovery in this case and that a subpoena is not actually necessary since what we are proceeding with is not a pitchess motion, and I'll explain that at greater length, your Honor.
I think it's important at the outset that we get past any question of label. This is not a pitchess motion. We are not seeking the personnel records of any specified police officer to show previous citizen complaints against that officer. What we are seeking is an investigative report that was done in connection with this very case to investigate issues raised by this case, and we believe that when witnesses are going to be called in this case to testify about those same events, that we are entitled as a matter of course to the statements that they made in the course of that investigation. I think the closest analogy that we have seen previously in this case is the investigation that was conducted on behalf of the police commission by Detective Mulldorfer with respect to the events that took place at Viertel's garage with regard to the Bronco. Here we had a separate internal investigation by the police department in which Detective Mulldorfer went to the garage and interviewed a number of witnesses who became material witnesses in this very case with respect to the same events, with respect to the chain of custody of the Bronco automobile. And, of course, that report was at that time produced and made available and the previous statements that those witnesses had made to Detective Mulldorfer were then available to both sides to confront and cross-examine and examine these witnesses with respect to those same events. Here, it's really just a matter of fortuity that this investigation was assigned to Internal Affairs. And simply by the administrative machinery of putting Internal Affairs in charge of this investigation, that does not insulate it from any discovery in a criminal case. The privilege that's created by penal code section 832.5 with respect to personnel records is a qualified privilege for personnel records. It is not a qualified privilege for Internal Affairs investigations. And if those Internal Affairs investigations relate directly to the ongoing disputes raised in the context of a criminal trial, we believe that those reports and the interviews of the witnesses involved should be available to both sides so that they can properly litigate the issues that are raised in this case. Now, this is not a fishing expedition. We're not looking for an Internal Affairs report so that we can fish through it and see whatever we might find that may be helpful, but--
Let me stop you for my clarity. Your request is for statements made during this investigation.
It is limited merely to statements of potential witnesses or witnesses that will testify in this case.
That is correct. We are not seeking conclusions. We are not seeking recommendations. We are not seeking any personnel action recommended with respect to any particular officer. We are looking for the statements of witnesses because those witnesses are material in this trial with respect to the same issues that were being investigated by Internal Affairs. We're talking about witnesses who will testify in this trial before the jury; notably, Michele Kestler, who was the director of the laboratory, commander--then commander, now deputy chief, David Gascon. And their testimony will relate directly to the subject of the investigation by Internal Affairs, that is leaks to the press. And also Mr. Matheson. So we believe that these statements--
Mr. Matheson is a deputy director of the laboratory. And all of these people were, of course, the focus of the Internal Affairs investigation into where the leaks were coming from of testing results in the course of the investigation and preparation for trial of this case. The issue is also relevant in the context of the--oh, I'm sorry. I've just been reminded that Erin Reilly and Collin Yamauchi, who are also employees of the laboratory, may have been interviewed in the course of this investigation. This investigation is also relevant in the context of the pending matter before Judge Ito with respect to piercing the shield law, because one of the factors that the Court is required to look at in determining whether the newsmen's or newsperson's shield law should be pierced, is whether there are alternative sources available to get the same information. And to the extent that these witnesses were interviewed with respect to their knowledge of leaks, we do have the exhaustion of an alternative source which may be a very compelling argument in favor of piercing the newsperson's shield law because now we are left with only the newspersons as the source of information about where these leaks came from. And finally, they're relevant in terms of any potential exculpatory material. Because the question of leaks has become a substantive issue in the context of this trial, we believe that any information that reveals the possibility of leaks within the Los Angeles Police Department may be exculpatory evidence that the Defendant is entitled to under Brady versus Maryland. So for all of these reasons, we believe--
Well, what type of--I mean, unless you have some theory of an exculpatory statement, then in that sense, it would be a fishing expedition. What are you looking specifically for?
We are looking specifically for information as to who had access to the information that was leaked, when they had it. We believe that the investigation may disclose a chain of events that points an inference or a circumstantial suggestion with respect to particular individuals who may have been the source of the leak. And we believe that that would come within the Brady rule in terms of being potentially exculpatory evidence to show that in fact, these leaks did come from the Los Angeles Police Department.
Now, for all of these reasons, the report we believe is relevant to issues that we are litigating in this trial. But we're not even asking that the report simply be turned over to the Defense. All that we're asking is that Judge Ito be allowed to conduct an in camera inspection of the report to see whether there is relevant and material evidence that should be made available to the Defense contained within that report. And under section 915 of the evidence code, whatever privileged information may be in that report can continue to be protected. And again, I emphasize that we're not asking for privileged personnel files. We are asking for actual witness statements that are a result of this investigation. Even the shield of personnel records, however, is not an impenetrable shield. Like any other shield--
All I want to emphasize, your Honor, is that the bottom line here is the Defendant's right to a fair trial and accommodating that right while still respecting whatever privileges may pertain with respect to any of this information. And we believe that this issue is such an important issue to be litigated in this trial, that to withhold from the Defense an investigation conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department into the very allegations and issues that we are litigating involving interviews of the very same witnesses whom we are calling as witnesses in this trial gives us a right of access to those interviews. Could I have just a moment?
I realize I have been making the assumption that your Honor is fully familiar with the relevance and materiality of the leaking issue in this case and perhaps I should take a moment to make sure that your Honor is aware of the context in which this issue arises.
Okay. Be somewhat brief. I believe that I am. I understand what you're asking for and the reasons you're asking for it. My concern is, apparently you interchange the report, assuming there is a report, with any statements made by one of these four or five witnesses or potential witnesses. And my concern is or at least my understanding of your request is only previous statements, if they were made by one of these five people to the LAPD Internal Affairs in regards to the issue which you present, and that is the leaking of information to the press.
Well, let me clarify that, your Honor. We believe the entire report should be turned over to Judge Ito for an in camera inspection. We don't claim that we're entitled to see the entire report. Judge Ito can then glean from the report whether there are specific witness statements that relate to witnesses that are irrelevant to these proceedings and, at the same time, he can ascertain whether there is Brady material contained in the report. I don't know that. I'm kind of flying blind. But we would like the in camera inspection to address both of those issues. And we believe it could also inform Judge Ito's resolution of the newsperson's shield law as well in terms of providing him with a factual basis for a finding that there is no reasonable alternative to piercing the newsperson's shield law.
So we think it's relevant for all of those purposes, but we recognize that we're entitled at least initially to the witness statements, and beyond that, we will rely on the in camera inspection. Now, the relevance of the leak, of course, is the fact that this leak occurred before DNA results had been obtained. In the case of one leak, the leak occurred very shortly after DNA results had been faxed to the LAPD laboratory. And from the standpoint of the defense being presented in this case with respect to the motive of the Los Angeles Police Department in terms of a motive to plant evidence, in respect to the integrity with which the evidence was handled, the fact that a leak emanated from the Los Angeles Police Department about DNA results before a DNA test had even been conducted, evidence is a good deal of confidence about those results that we believe would be informative for the jury in terms of resolving the issues that are directly presented by the Defense in this case.
Thank you, your Honor. I have I guess a three-part argument that I want to formulate. The first has to do with clarifying what it is that the Defense is seeking here. Dean Uelmen suggested that this is not a pitchess motion and you tended you said to agree. We use a lot of shorthand in criminal law, and I think the phrase "Pitchess motion" certainly is one of those shorthand phrases. The statutory scheme goes beyond a request for personnel records which we most frequently see in police abuse cases or wrongful arrest cases. Penal code section 832.7 defines two types of records which are confidential. The first type of records are police personnel records. These are further defined in penal code section 832.8. The second type of record, however, that section 832.7 talks about are records of complaints maintained pursuant to penal code section 832.5.
Well, these are complaints that the department has investigated. I don't think--I understand that the statute uses the word "Citizens," your Honor, but I don't think the word "Citizens" should be viewed as anything more than a descriptive word. I don't think it's intended by the legislature to have a limited meaning.
Are you suggesting that if there was internal investigations, that it was based upon some outside party or an internal request from the Los Angeles Police Department to investigate the accusations that were made?
I suggest that it doesn't make any difference, your Honor, because initially, the legislature commands police departments to set up mechanisms for receiving and investigating citizen complaints. That's at penal code section 832.5. I don't know what the legislature had in mind when they used the word "Citizen." I'm quite clear for one thing that they didn't mean to preclude noncitizen aliens from being able to have their complaints about police misconduct heard.
No. But I think it is clear, at least in my reading, that is a complaint made by somebody outside of the police department.
Well, the reason why I don't agree with that, your Honor, is that the legislature in enacting section 832.5 was attempting to deal with the issue which had arisen previously and which was addressed in the pitchess decision regarding police department destruction of records of investigations, and they were attempting to balance the need of a police department to maintain some confidentiality in its records with the public's need to have access upon sufficient showing. And I do not think that that difference turns on whether the investigations stem from a complaint made by an insider or a complaint made by an outsider because the social importance of having the confidentiality of those reports and at the same time granting access upon a sufficient showing is identical whether it be an outsider complaining about police misconduct or an insider complaining about police misconduct. I have been representing Internal Affairs for many years and I can represent to the Court that a great number of complaints regarding police misconduct originate from police officers. As a matter of fact, Los Angeles police officers are under an affirmative duty to report to their superiors any instances of misconduct or abuse which they see, and these are then investigated pursuant to the methods that the police department set up under the direction of the legislature in section 832.5. When the legislature said in section 832.7 that those documents were confidential, I think they had in mind that they were protecting the interest of the police department and maintaining confidentiality of any type of internal investigation of misconduct, and I think those two analysis should be overcome. When the Los Angeles Police Department established its procedures, it decided to include complaints, whatever their source, in this same general umbrella of coverage that's set forth in the declaration submitted by the police department by Commander Davis. The police department has traditionally insisted that these records be considered under the rhetoric of evidence code section 1043. This is not a particularly onerous demand to place upon criminal defendants or plaintiffs in civil suits. All that is required to obtain exactly the result that Dean Uelmen is asking for is that they comply with the procedural requirements in 1043, a noticed motion, a declaration laying out materiality identification of the officers whose records are being sought and then leave it to the Judge to make a determination of whether the materiality has been met and whether the procedures have been met. I don't know whether they can do that. I've heard Dean Uelmen express statements today as to why these matters are material. They were never incorporated in any sort of an affidavit. The affidavit that was submitted with the subpoena duces tecum is certainly insufficient to justify intrusion into confidential records. It's merely a boilerplate statement. I don't think that it's asking too much of this team of highly experienced and competent Defense attorneys to simply comply with the legislature's directive. These documents are privileged. Now, the second part of my argument really is derivative of the first. I'm not clear what it is that the Defense is requesting. I was given the subpoena duces tecum for the Internal Affairs report and I responded to that in my motion to squash. I'm aware that there was a motion filed with the Prosecution. A copy was handed to me, but it was not served to the police department and certainly not directed at the police department. Dean Uelmen today said that the SDT is basically mooted out and yet his concluding statements, he suggested that nonetheless, he thinks that report should go before Judge Ito for an in camera review. Frankly, I don't care whether Judge Ito reviews some or all of the report. My clients, however, believe that the Defendant should be held to the letter of the law. If they want to review these, they should meet the requirements set up by the legislature for reviewing confidential documents. They have done it in the past. There have been many other motions before this court, decided by this court in which the Defense has done precisely that. We have reviewed peace officer personnel records. We have reviewed by means of a pitchess motion an investigation into allegations that one of the witnesses in the lawsuit, in the Prosecution, a police officer had made references to the deceased that suggested that he had more knowledge of her than he would in the normal course of affairs. All of these were done under the rhetoric of pitchess and under the guidance of section 1043. I don't understand why we have deviated from that at this point, and I would ask the Court to rule that the Defense should meet the 1043 procedural requirements.
Which of course one of which is a 15-day notice, which means we delay the proceedings.
And the last time we were in here, your Honor, in February, I was willing to waive that and we got the motion in two days. I'm not trying to make this trial last any longer than it's already lasted, but I haven't seen a declaration of materiality that I could address to decide whether the confidentiality of these records should be overcome.
I don't understand, and perhaps because I'm not fully a part of this trial, but only a very peripheral number, what the materiality is between the suggestion, their suggestion that a Los Angeles police employee is responsible for leaking information to the press in any relevant issue in this. It may very well be there, but it's not something that's clear to me, and I can't stand here and argue it without having it laid out for me. My clients are entitled to have a lawyer who can address these issues, and I can't do that. I don't understand how it is that the Defense sees this as a relevant matter. In terms of the exculpatory, potentially exculpatory nature of anything contained in this report, the police department is certainly aware of its constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory information to the Prosecution so that it can be turned over to the Defense, and the police department has never hesitated to do that. I'm not making any representation about what is or is not in the report, but that's really not at issue. This is not a motion to obtain potential exculpatory evidence. It doesn't come into play. The bottom line Dean Uelmen said is the Defendant's right to a fair trial. Fairness is the process that we're looking for here, but that fairness applies equally as well to the police officers and other department personnel whose records are being sought as part of this internal investigation, and I would ask the Court to require the Defense to comply with the requirements of the statute. Thank you.
So in essence, what you're saying is, if they conform with what you believe the requirements of the penal code and the evidence code, then you will comply by bringing those records in for an in camera review if it falls within 1043 and 1045 of the evidence code?
I'm not trying to say I won't comply at all. I have the custodian of records here right now if it's ordered that we have an in camera review. But my point is that this is a two-step process, and the first step is the Judge is required to make a determination of materiality based upon an affidavit and I'm entitled to challenge that once I've seen it. I haven't seen it yet.
That's assuming that it falls within the 832.5 and .7 penal code sections, that it is a citizen's complaint, and we can argue and debate whether this is a citizen's complaint, and whether it then--procedurally we have to go through what is required under 1043.
Well, I'm over here in response to the subpoena duces tecum as is the custodian of records and that's basically all that I'm addressing, and that subpoena is clearly seeking the very type of report that's identified by section 832.5. There is also a motion that's in front of you directed to the Prosecution asking them to produce records which they don't have and which, if they were to ask the police department to provide to them, very likely the police department would say no. That would be back-dooring the requirements of evidence code section 1043. Tell the Defense to make a pitchess motion. And I--I'm not--I do not feel that the police department was properly put on notice that this motion was addressed to them by being handed to me in court. It's not addressed to the police department. It's addressed to the Prosecution. The police department relies on the provisions of section 1043, which says they are entitled to separate notice. They haven't received that notice. But I'm not trying to stonewall anyone. I think it's important that these arguments be made and that the law be adhered to. If you decide otherwise, as I said, I have these records here and we are ready for an in camera review, but I don't think it should be called for on the record before this court.
Very briefly, your Honor. I don't think there's much question but that the substance of everything that 1043 requires is in our moving papers. What is missing, however, is the identification of any particular officer because that's not what we are seeking. And I think that goes to the heart of why--what we're pursuing is not a pitchess motion. A pitchess motion is directed to personnel records of a particular named officer. Now, we could put a list together if we want to play guessing games of every officer we think that Internal Affairs might have talked to in the course of this investigation.
Let me stop you there. Unless I've misinterpreted what Mr. Walsh has said, he's not arguing that point. The point he's arguing, technically you've not conformed with 1043 and its requirements, but specifically its materiality of the subject matter that you have requested. And 1043 does require an affidavit which is not before me. It is merely a motion. And I don't stand on form over substance. If it was given to the District Attorney, I presume that he passed it on to Mr. Walsh. If that's incorrect, please inform me.
All right. So, you know, may not be technically the appropriate notice, but at least you were so informed. The question then becomes, is it material and have you reached that threshold to where then Judge Ito should have an in camera hearing to determine what should or should not be turned over.
Well, the materiality is established by the very nature of the investigation that was being conducted. It was an investigation into the source of leaks of information in this very case. In fact, your Honor was inquiring whether this was a citizen complaint. The complainant was the Judge presiding in this trial. It was Judge Ito who initiated the request for some sort of internal investigation by the LAPD as to where these leaks were coming from in frustration experienced by all of the counsel in this case of picking up the morning newspaper and reading about lab results that we hadn't even seen yet, and Judge Ito took the extraordinary step of ordering that all of those results should no longer go to the Los Angeles Police Department, they should come directly to the Court and then be distributed to counsel. So this is not a personnel complaint with respect to any individual officer of the Los Angeles Police Department. It is an investigation into circumstances that relate directly to this case and to issues that we are litigating in this case.
Well, that's the question. What is the material issue? The fact that Judge Ito was frustrated because things were being reported at a time, at least as I recall, a time the jury was attempting to be selected obviously is quite frustrating and I'm sure that's the reason he asked for the investigation. But as to it being a material issue that is being presented to the trier of fact or before this Court, that is the issue of materiality.
Well, it becomes a material issue in the context of the defense being presented in this case that evidence was compromised in the way that it was handled by the Los Angeles Police Department. And the fact that officers of the Los Angeles Police Department were leaking test results before the tests had even been conducted is highly material in terms of the trier of fact resolving that issue with respect to the integrity of the handling of the evidence in this case. So it goes directly to the whole chain of custody issue, to the issue of whether there was possible tampering with the evidence, to the issue of the motivation of the Los Angeles Police Department in the way it conducted the investigation of this case. Those are the issues we are litigating in this defense. And we're calling the same witnesses we believe that were interviewed. And, of course, we don't know that. We haven't seen the report. But we believe and we have testimony already from Michele Kestler in a 402 hearing conducted by Judge Ito that she was interviewed by officers of the Internal Affairs Division in the course of an internal investigation. So we know this investigation took place. We know of at least one witness who was questioned. There may be others. I--I believe Matheson also testified that he had spoken to officers. So it is not seeking personnel records. It is seeking an Internal Affairs investigation. And I think where we part company essentially is that they are reading the statutes and the evidence code sections as some sort of privilege for Internal Affairs investigations, and that's not what the statute or the evidence code provisions are talking about. They're talking about the protection of personnel records with respect to citizen complaints. We're talking about something else and we don't believe that the privilege created by the statute or the evidence code extends to any broad shield that can be erected around anything that Internal Affairs does regardless of its materiality or relevance to an ongoing criminal prosecution.
All right. Mr. Darden, I see you either getting antsy or you want to address the Court.
Good afternoon, sir. Would the Court hear from Deputy D.A. Hank Goldberg on the issue of whether or not the information sought is relevant and material?
I wanted to primarily address the issue of materiality, your Honor. But before I got into that, I just wanted to say a few words about the appropriate discovery vehicle that's previously been discussed by counsel.
Well, let me stop you. And I seem to think that we keep getting off the track or I don't understand where we're going. Mr. Walsh led me to believe that the issue really before me, is it material. If it is material, then he will in essence forego some of the other formalities of discovery since he's prepared to address that if the Court allows an in camera hearing. Mr. Uelmen says it's material because the Judge requested it and it pertains to the Defense. We all get back to the same issue, at least is my understanding, is it material to the sense that the Court should grant an in camera hearing to determine whether there is discoverable statements made by a potential witness in this case which should be used in preparing examination of that witness.
I agree with the Court that does seem to be the primary issue, but if I understand what Mr. Walsh said, and I'm sure he'll correct me if I'm wrong, one of the reasons that he wants compliance with the so-called pitchess procedures is that he would like a declaration from the Defense so that he could determine whether or not it was material and fully understand what their argument is or what their facts are to support the allegation if this does have some materiality.
Is this the same issue that's presented to Judge Ito in the shield, the reporter's shield, as to whether it's material, to whether or not that shield should be pierced for the benefit of the Defendant's right to a fair trial as weighed against the reporter's right to protect sources?
So are you not asking me or all of you not asking me to make the same decision that he has to make in that particular decision?
Well, that's what I think, your Honor. And there's also a third context in which it comes up, and that's the People have filed a motion to preclude the Defense from cross-examining Michele Kestler about the subjects of the leaks, and the grounds that we stated in precluding that cross-examination is lack of materiality. So it actually has three potential impacts in this trial. And in all due respect to the Court, that's why I was a little bit confused as to how the Court could decide the issue of materiality given that that really is at the center of three distinct issues that are before Judge Ito and plays a key role in terms of the overall issues in this case and what is or is not at issue in this case. So I don't know how your Honor wants to deal with that problem.
Well, I'm somewhat disadvantaged. I don't know all the facts and the circumstances that have been presented nor the previous arguments. If we are down to that issue and if everybody agrees that that issue is before Judge Ito at least in two other circumstances, then I am prepared to allow him to make the decision as to whether or not it is material. If it then is material, if he rules that the subject is relevant, it is a material issue that should be presented, then I assume--strike that--then it would be the Court's intended order to allow an in camera review of the internal investigations reports dealing with witnesses' statements. If he rules it is not material, then this all becomes moot and the intended ruling of this Court is that it would not be discoverable. Now, Mr. Walsh, you want to respond?
I want to briefly agree with what Mr. Goldberg said and clarify the police department's position. We do believe that the basic issue is materiality. I don't know whether it's the same question of materiality involved in the reporter's shield law involved in the Prosecution motion that Mr. Goldberg referred to, but the question is materiality. However, the police department wants to insist on its 1043 right to have that materiality laid out in a declaration and affidavit, not by representations of counsel.
All right. Let me stop you there. Mr. Uelmen, I think they technically have the right to have that affidavit or declaration. When can that be prepared and served upon Mr. Walsh for the L.A. Police Department?
We can take the material that's in our moving papers and put it in a declaration and file it tomorrow. But again, that is assuming that this motion is governed by the pitchess requirements. I think your Honor is on the right track with respect to the determination of materiality. In fact, section 1045 of the evidence code which honors the right of the Defendant to material that is relevant to the subject matter in the pending litigation provides that in determining relevance, the court shall examine the information in chambers in conformity with section 915. So what's initially required to get production of the report is simply a prima facie showing of materiality like in a discovery motion. It has potential relevance. And then once it's produced, the court makes that determination in the course of its in camera inspection. There's certainly more than enough to show the prima facie materiality in our moving papers, and we can put that in a declaration form, although we don't believe that that's required because it's not a pitchess motion.
Well, once again, I think it's form over substance. But I'm going to require that of the Defense, to present that to Mr. Walsh or a representative of the Los Angeles Police Department. I think the Court always has to determine whether something is material before it should be turned over by way of discovery. Whether or not it falls within the four corners of 1043 and 1045 and the other sections that we have previously mentioned, I think at that point, when Judge Ito has an opportunity to review the affidavit or declaration, then I think that it would be appropriate because he's far more familiar than I to make the determination as to whether or not it's material. And, if necessary, I will then, based upon his decision, make a ruling whether or not there should be in camera proceedings for which I understand all parties have agreed that he will hold, he will review whatever is available and then make the decision as to what is discoverable or not. I will only make the order if he makes a determination it's material. Now, does anybody want to add anything at this point or we'll leave it at that?
In that regard, your Honor, it's a scheduling matter. We certainly appreciate what your Honor's indicated. We seem to be on the right track here. We can certainly have that declaration tomorrow morning. As a matter of importance, however, we're at that stage in the trial where these may very well be the next witnesses. I have represented to Judge Ito this afternoon that we need a ruling on this along with some other motions he's working on that will also be important. We don't have other witnesses at this point in the trial. So we need to get this done and need your availability perhaps tomorrow morning because we want to resolve this, get this to Judge Ito. He can make his judgment regarding materiality. If you then rule or make an order, he can then review the documents and then make a determination because these will be our next witnesses. We need time to look at those reports before calling those individuals.
All right. Well, I'm available anytime after 7:00 tomorrow morning. I think you need to make some arrangements with Mr. Walsh and Mr. Darden and whoever else what time those will be presented and then present it also to Judge Ito and give him the opportunity to review them.
I think we're also entitled to make some argument about them, which means we'll need to have time to review and, if possible, to prepare points and authorities in response to it.
Mr. Walsh, I understand your position, but I suspect this is not coming totally as a surprise to you.
Nor is it coming totally as a surprise to the Defense either, your Honor. They've had I believe 10 months to prepare this motion. They have had six days since I filed my motion to quash the SDT where I put them on notice that I was claiming this was covered by the provisions of section 1043. They're waiting until this afternoon and now they're saying, gee, they have to have an expedited ruling on it. I think that the police department is entitled to have its opportunity to be heard in this matter. The legislature has set out the procedures. I'm not insisting on 15 days, but I don't want a five-minute or two-hour turnaround either.
I'm sure we can have it here by 8:30 tomorrow morning and we would expedite it and we certainly aren't dragging our feet because, you know, Mr. Walsh--
No. Let's not make accusations. It accomplishes nothing. Let's try to expedite it, giving both sides an opportunity to a full hearing and to litigate the issues. You'll have it by 8:30. Is there a time set tomorrow for the return of the jury?
We have not reached--I think the jury may still be somewhere upstairs now I believe, your Honor. They've not been released yet. So the Court still can do that. We perhaps still need to speak with Judge Ito after this is over, all parties.
All right. Why don't we stand in recess at this particular time. Let me have an opportunity to confer with Judge Ito and then, if necessary, with counsel in regards to when we can have an opportunity for not only Mr. Walsh, but for he to review the declaration and make a determination and, if necessary, hear from counsel. And I will make myself available tomorrow at any time so we can hopefully resolve this to everybody's satisfaction. All right. Let's stand in recess then.
This is not a pitchess motion. We are not seeking the personnel records of any specified police officer to show previous citizen complaints against that officer. What we are seeking is an investigative report that was done in connection with this very case to investigate issues raised by this case.
The complainant was the Judge presiding in this trial. It was Judge Ito who initiated the request for some sort of internal investigation by the LAPD as to where these leaks were coming from.
The fact that a leak emanated from the Los Angeles Police Department about DNA results before a DNA test had even been conducted, evidence is a good deal of confidence about those results that we believe would be informative for the jury in terms of resolving the issues that are directly presented by the Defense in this case.
I'm not trying to stonewall anyone. I think it's important that these arguments be made and that the law be adhered to. If you decide otherwise, as I said, I have these records here and we are ready for an in camera review.
I will only make the order if he makes a determination it's material.