📄 Motion: reconsider Fuhrman testimony ruling — Thursday, December 5, 1996
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C:\DEPT103\CIVIL\1996\DEC\5\MOTION-RECONSIDER-FUHRMAN-TEST.DOC
TRIAL
▲ Day 26 of 57

Motion: reconsider Fuhrman testimony ruling

Date: Thursday, December 5, 1996 • Utterances: 23
The defense moved for reconsideration of Judge Fujisaki's earlier ruling barring Mark Fuhrman's criminal trial testimony, arguing the court had incorrectly characterized their sole purpose as impeachment when they had other substantive reasons to introduce it. Gelblum countered that Evidence Code Section 1292 makes no distinction based on purpose — the testimony is inadmissible because the prosecution offered it at the criminal trial and never had opportunity to cross-examine it. Fujisaki denied the motion, though he pointedly noted that the defense's 'half a loaf' position (dropping impeachment and seeking only substantive use) might fare better on appeal.
1 (REGINA D. CHAVEZ, OFFICIAL REPORTER)
2 (The following proceedings were held in open court, outside the presence of the jury.)
3 THE COURT:

Okay.

I believe we have Defendant's motion for reconsideration of the Court's ruling regarding former testimony of Mark Fuhrman.

Go ahead.

4 MR. LEONARD:

Your Honor, what prompted the filing of the motion was a comment Your Honor made in the order, which suggests -- actually, didn't suggest -- it actually stated that the only reason that we were proposing to read the prior testimony of Detective Fuhrman was to try to impeach him. And I thought we had made it fairly clear in our earlier filing that that was not the only reason.

And the purpose for filing this motion -- and I understand that it's an unusual procedure, but the purpose was simply to make it crystal clear to Your Honor that that was not the only reason; and, in fact, there were several other areas that we outlined in the motion that we felt that his prior testimony was pertinent and -- and crucial to our -- to our case. And I think we've outlined those fairly clearly.

We did attempt to articulate that in our earlier filings. Going back through them, I thought we could have done a better job of that. I wanted to make sure that Your Honor was aware of our position; because, frankly, given what you stated in your order, I feel -- felt like we didn't communicate that as clearly as we could to you.

So that's the main reason we wanted to do this official filing. So, it's -- to the extent that your order and ruling was relying upon the fact -- or ruling that that was the only reason that we were proposing to call his testimony, we felt that that was incorrect. And then again, that it was possibly primarily our fault, that we hadn't articulated clearly enough the reasons, other than impeachment, that we wanted to elicit the testimony of Detective Fuhrman.

5 THE COURT:

Well, do I understand the Defendant's position to be that the Defendant's counsel wish to offer Fuhrman's criminal-trial testimony, and at the same time, impeach him?

6 MR. LEONARD:

Yes, we do.

7 THE COURT:

That's what I thought.

And do you wish to respond?

8 MR. GELBLUM:

That was one of the points I wanted to make clear.

And the second is that Sections 1291 and 1292 make no distinction whatsoever as to the purpose for what -- for which the evidence is being used. It just says it can't be used if the party against them being offered doesn't have an opportunity to cross-examine at the prior trial.

9 MR. LEONARD:

One final point.

If Your Honor was inclined to allow us to read in portions at this juncture, or in our case to read in portions that were not impeachment, but portions that we set forth, we'd be -- obviously, we'll take half a loaf. We're not -- we don't want to do that, but we will. And we'll argue at a later time, if it is appropriate, that we were permitted to impeach. In response to your question.

10 MR. GELBLUM:

Again, just -- the statute makes no distinction whatsoever for the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. None.

Because you can't offer it if the party against them is offered -- was not a party to the prior action, and the party in the similar position in the prior action did not have an opportunity to cross-examine, which is clearly the case here, since the prosecution offered the testimony, did not cross-examine the testimony.

Your prior ruling was absolutely correct in that regard and this -- the issue has no bearing on that whatsoever.

11 THE COURT:

Well --

12 MR. LEONARD:

Your Honor --

13 THE COURT:

Yes?

14 MR. LEONARD:

Would you like to hear any more? I mean, I think we've --

15 THE COURT:

You want to make your record.

16 MR. LEONARD:

I mean, we're now going -- we're now going back into the arguments that were made before. And to the extent you want anymore clarification, I'm willing to do that.

Obviously, I think we made our position very clear on this motion of substance over form with regard to cross-examination, and you apparently did not accept that.

I can revisit that at this point, if you'd like, I think.

17 THE COURT:

I just want to give you the opportunity of clarifying the record. I think the Court's ruling was a very technical one. It's a position that, I think, by your current position -- position with regards to taking half a loaf and foregoing the impeachment, would stand you in good stead on the appeal.

I'm allowing you to perfect your record to that extent.

If I were sitting on a Court of Appeal, I would possibly be more receptive to that argument, than just being a lowly trial judge.

18 MR. LEONARD:

I'm not sure I understand what you're saying. Let me --

19 THE COURT:

I'm letting you make your record with regards to the fact that, by taking that position, perhaps the Court would say the plaintiffs' position is more akin to that of the prosecutor than it would be if it's your intention to impeach him, and offer the evidence solely for the purposes of impeachment.

20 MR. LEONARD:

Obviously, just so the record is clear, I --

21 THE COURT:

Yeah.

22 MR. LEONARD:

-- feel we're treading on delicate ground.

Just so the record is clear, I don't want my suggestion that we would take half a loaf to, in any way, constitute a waiver of our initial position. I want to you understand that.

That's not what I'm saying . . . I'm just saying that if Your Honor were to -- were to modify his -- the ruling -- I mean, there's nothing we can do about that.

But we wanted to make it perfectly clear that there are other reasons beyond impeachment that we're offering the testimony. Again, that was our desire to do that, was triggered by the -- what you stated in the order, which I felt.

So that's our position. I don't want it construed as any type of a waiver of our initial position.

Thank you, Your Honor.

23 THE COURT:

I think I'm constrained to stay with the interpretation of the Evidence Code Section 1292, as previously stated. Motion is denied.

KEY QUOTE

Temperature

procedural

Key Quotes (5)

Dan Leonard
I wanted to make sure that Your Honor was aware of our position; because, frankly, given what you stated in your order, I felt like we didn't communicate that as clearly as we could to you.
Defense framing the motion as a clarification rather than a rehash — trying to reopen a lost ruling without appearing to relitigate it.
Peter Gelblum
Sections 1291 and 1292 make no distinction whatsoever as to the purpose for which the evidence is being used. It just says it can't be used if the party against whom it's being offered doesn't have an opportunity to cross-examine at the prior trial.
Cuts to the heart of the ruling: the reason for offering the testimony is irrelevant — the procedural bar under the Evidence Code applies regardless.
Hiroshi Fujisaki
If I were sitting on a Court of Appeal, I would possibly be more receptive to that argument, than just being a lowly trial judge.
Unusual judicial candor — Fujisaki essentially signals that the defense's argument has appellate merit while explaining why he's bound to deny it at the trial level.
Dan Leonard
I don't want my suggestion that we would take half a loaf to, in any way, constitute a waiver of our initial position.
Defense carefully preserving its full appellate record after Fujisaki's hint, making clear the conditional offer was not an abandonment of the impeachment argument.
Hiroshi Fujisaki
I think I'm constrained to stay with the interpretation of the Evidence Code Section 1292, as previously stated. Motion is denied.
Terse final ruling — 'constrained' signals Fujisaki sees the argument's merit but feels bound by the statute.

Evidence (1)

Informal
Mark Fuhrman's prior testimony from the criminal trial
admissibility challenged and denied under Evidence Code Sections 1291 and 1292

Notable Exchanges (1)

Hiroshi FujisakiDan Leonard
Fujisaki hints that the defense's conditional offer to forgo impeachment and seek only substantive use of Fuhrman's testimony might be better received by an appellate court — essentially coaching the defense on how to preserve a stronger appellate argument while denying the motion.
strategic

Objections

None recorded
Proceeding 8492 • 23 utterances
Civil Trial
Department 103
⚖️ Start
📂 DEC 5, 1996 📄 Motion: reconsider Fuhrman tes
DEC 5, 1996 KRT DvH TD