All right. Back on the record in the Simpson matter. All parties are again present. I've had the opportunity to read the state of Ohio versus Herschal Roberts. The court's ruling is as follows: As to the admission or nonadmission of the statement by Mr. Peratis, the record reflects that the court previously made a finding of unavailability of Mr. Peratis on the basis of his medical condition, that medical condition having been prior heart bypass surgeries and now a quadruple bypass surgery. I believe this was his third bypass surgery. His doctor had indicated he was not available to testify in court. Neither side has chosen to challenge that finding at this point. The Prosecution's offer is that of a statement as evidence of impeachment of a hearsay declarant under evidence code section 1202. This is not an offer under 11235, an offer of a prior inconsistent statement or of an inconsistent statement for the truth of the matter stated. It is merely for impeachment purposes. It is therefore limited in its use. The cite to the Roberts case is not applicable to this particular fact situation. The court has found previously the unavailability of this particular witness. The court allowed the Defense to then present prior testimony both before the grand jury under oath and before the magistrate at the preliminary hearing. And under any circumstance, a statement made by a witness which is inconsistent with their--not under any circumstances, but under most normal circumstances, an inconsistent statement would be admissible for the purposes of impeachment. The troubling part of the proffer is that this videotape contains the demonstration of an inadmissible experiment and contains extraneous double and triple hearsay information given to Mr. Peratis by other persons. The court will sustain the objection to the experiment part of the tape, anything that is irrelevant or extraneous. The People may offer an edited portion of the videotape where Mr. Peratis specifically discusses his testimony regarding the amount in the syringe. However, the remainder is excluded as being superfluous, and the court will see the videotape in its final form before it's exhibited to the jury. All right. That's the order. All right. Any other issue we can take up before we recess for the day? Mr. Shapiro.
Your Honor, an important matter, the letter memorandum and request for leave concerning the testing of Mr. Goldman's blue jeans and statements of discovery with respect to the testimony of proposed testimony of Mr. Deedrick, I have to bring to the court's attention.
Yes. Now, your Honor, yesterday, they turned over what appears to be a report from Mr. Deedrick wherein he indicates that he is going to testify based on experiments that he's already done, that the imprints on the blue jeans of Mr. Goldman came from Mr. Goldman's shirt and the imprints on the letter and the piece of paper came from Mr. Goldman's blue jeans. Now, the Prosecution turned over to us a few photographs and statements about how on August 21st, the day before Dr. Lee testified--this is very curious because Mr. Goldberg was saying it all came as a big surprise to them, but on August 21st, they went and did test impressions too of Mr. Goldman's jeans. And the way the test impressions were performed is apparently using something they call an indicator. But from the pictures, it appears to be something that they ordinarily use to roll palm prints, and they would press this yellow--what they call in the reports a yellow piece of paper onto the jeans and then they would place--then roll it with a roller. Then they place a white piece of paper on top of them and then they roll it over the jeans and then they get some kind of what they call impression. They apparently did two of those on August 21st. We have a small picture of one of those, but nothing that we can show an expert that they can do anything with and we have no idea whether this is what Mr. Deedrick's using. Then on August 31st, they took five more impressions of the jeans and they took impressions from Mr. Goldman's shirt and they took impressions from his shoes. The shoes have been ruled out. Apparently all these documents were then sent to Mr. Deedrick in Washington where he made an analysis and came up with a report. This was done without notice to the Defense. Now, what I can show the court--and the pictures they have, p numbers of 4971 and 4967, and I would like to mark these as exhibits if I could. Why don't we deem them Defendant's next in order a and B.
All right. And what--the court can see, and these are apparently the impressions that were done. 1374.
--shows the piece of paper that presumably has an impression on it, and 1374-B shows the jeans before this process was done. Now, we haven't seen the jeans since they went through this process, but I know from their own reports that they did five more impressions on the jeans since then. And what you see there is the results of only the first two impressions. And I think the court can see that on the jeans itself, there is a triangular impression that must come from the other side of the jeans being impressed onto the front side of the jeans. In other words, you can see an imprint pattern or a pattern on the jeans after they went through this process that wasn't on the jeans beforehand. Now, that is a matter of serious concern under Griffen and Arizona versus Youngblood. The reason it's a matter of serious concern is, Dr. Lee testified to the imprint patterns on the jeans, and those imprint patterns I dare say were favorable evidence to the Defense. That's clear. It's the subject of their rebuttal. This court had already issued an order that we're supposed to be given 48 hours' notice if the Prosecution is going to conduct any potentially destructive tests so that we can have an opportunity for an expert to be there and also to litigate the reasonableness of doing that test. It seems absolutely clear to any sensible person that the process of taking this test impression as they went about it would create a risk of altering the jeans. What's worse is that it's plain from the photographs of August 21st that they altered the jeans with the first two test impressions they took. And we haven't seen the jeans since and there are no pictures of them that I see here, but they apparently did five for test impressions. Of course, they have done the same thing to the shirt.
So it seems to me that there is an issue here that we will have to litigate with respect to a bad faith alteration of exculpatory evidence. I mean, this is a classic because there was an outstanding order. It could be--anybody could see, even particularly after the August 21st impressions, that they were going to alter the evidence. So there's really no good faith justification for doing this. Anyway, they were under orders not to do it. Any responsible Prosecutor would have given us notice. In fact, quite the opposite was going on. We were sitting here with Mr. Hodgman and Mr. Yochelson looking for Mr. Goldberg to get various data from him about contact sheets and something else and there were 1054 proffers to the court. I don't know what they were about, what they were going to do, but they shouldn't have been doing this in the fashion they did without giving us notice. We cannot fully litigate how much these jeans were altered or the other items. We haven't seen them yet. I don't have experts available to look at them yet, particularly since we don't have the underlying data that apparently is going to form the basis of Mr. Deedrick's testimony. That is, we don't have the actual test impressions.
Now, I asked Mr. Goldberg yesterday when we were going to get this data and when we were going to have an opportunity to look at the jeans, take a look at their test impressions, compare it with one expert so we can make copies of the test impressions, see which ones or which part of this pattern Mr. Deedrick is claiming matches something on the envelope, the piece of paper or how something from the shirt matches the jeans, and then we have to see what he's actually done. And I asked him what was going on and would they give us notice that they were going to do something else. He told me, well, he takes the position that nothing gets altered, it's not a destructive test and that he, Mr. Deedrick, is going to arrive here sometime tomorrow afternoon. And for the purposes of only having one witness testify, he's already finished the report for only having one witness testify rather than bring in these people from the LAPD who actually rolled the impressions. He was going to have Mr. Deedrick do more test impressions. So only one witness would have to testify and they wouldn't have to bring these other people in. And I asked him, "Well, are you going to give us notice and reasonable opportunity to bring an expert there to even observe this and to litigate the issue of whether you can go about and do yet another set of test impressions even after he's finished his report and alter the evidence some more?" And he said, "Well, I'll tell you when he's coming, but we won't wait for you." Now, I've done my best to try to get somebody here who's knowledgeable in the area. I've spoken to Mr. Morton. He can be here on Thursday if Mr. Deedrick is going to come and bring his materials. But we want to just basically have an opportunity to look at the jeans, review with Mr. Deedrick the test impression sheets that he has, see exactly what the basis of these experiments are, have Mr. Morton review it, make copies of it, send it to Dr. Lee and Professor MacDonell so we can have evaluation of it. And I can tell you this. We won't be ready to either litigate the issue that--the Arizona versus Youngblood issue or another extraordinary substantial issue I see. And that is, I don't think there's a sound basis just from what I've seen so far to get these experiments into evidence under the substantial similarity test and the way the court has been ruling on these experiments.
It's a very serious issue. I can't even adequately litigate that until I see the underlying data from these reports. So I'm, you know, really quite flabbergasted that Miss Clark, who likely is going to be putting this on, she can stand up here and say, "Well, we are going to rest on Thursday," calling Deedrick the next two days, you know, when they're not even making an effort to furnish us discovery. And worse than that, they're spoiling the evidence. I mean, this is a railroad, and there has--this has to stop because this is completely inconsistent with the discovery law in this state, inconsistent with positions they've taken. It's ridiculous. So the relief that we're asking for--and I think it's one that's reasonably designed to try to get this trial over within a fashion that's fair--is that we can bring Mr. Morton down, he can look at this data, we can evaluate it, we can file our motions with respect to any alteration. There is no need for them to take yet another test impression just so Mr. Deedrick alone can testify because that is on its face gratuitous. He's already filed his report based on the data he has, and we need an opportunity to evaluate the evidence to make our Griffen motion with respect to that evidence by whatever prejudice has ensued and also to file a fully informed motion with the court objecting to those experiments because I can see right now that there are serious problems here and something I'm sure the court will want to look into. If we're given that opportunity to get the data on Thursday, I can send it federal express to Dr. Lee and Professor MacDonell, we can evaluate it over the weekend, we'll file the papers on Monday. The court can consider it. After the ruling, we'll see whether or not Mr. Deedrick can testify and we can proceed from there. That's my proposal to do this expeditiously. And we want--as indicated in my letter memorandum, we want the relief of having the discovery that we've entitled to by tomorrow or certainly by Thursday I should say, the opportunity for our expert to look at the shirt, the pants, et cetera, and what Mr. Deedrick's done and then an opportunity to have our expert look at it before they do anything else to this evidence so we can proceed in an expeditious manner.
Thank you. This is remarkable, your Honor. I don't know whether the court's had an opportunity to read our motion yet for discovery sanctions relating to Dr. Lee. I hope the court perhaps will take a look at that before dealing with this issue if your Honor feels you have to take this under submission, if you feel that you cannot summarily dispose of it right now. I learned for the first time on or about August--excuse me--on or about August the 21st when I spoke to Dr. Lee that somehow he had excluded the jeans as having made the impressions in this case. I did not learn that as a result of Defense discovery. It was not documented in any report. I learned it as a result of my conversations with Dr. Lee. He was cooperative with me. I learned for the very first time on this witness stand that he also excluded the shirt. That was not documented. That was not in any Defense discovery. And now they are claiming that somehow we have violated our discovery obligations and our legal obligations because upon learning of these violations and of this evidence, we expeditiously went about being able to confront it and present a rebuttal case as quickly as we can. I do find that to be remarkable. Now, your Honor, just so the record is clear on some of these factual points, on August the 21st or on or about August the 21st--this was around the time that I learned from Dr. Lee I believe his statement about the jeans--I caused an impression to be made pursuant to the instructions of Mr. Bodziak, who I also consulted in order to be able to cross-examine Mr. Lee on this point. I was working very rapidly. I didn't have any real notice on this issue by the Defense. I wanted to know in my own mind before cross-examining Dr. Lee whether or not the jeans could have been involved and possibly had that impression to be used as an exhibit for cross-examination. I tentatively planned on using it, but elected not to during cross-examination. I felt that it was tactically not necessary. On the 31st, after learning that Dr. Lee had also excluded the shirt, I wanted impressions to be made of an examination quality of both items immediately so that that material could immediately be sent to the FBI so that we could rapidly perform tests so that we would be able to present evidence in our rebuttal case. And as it is, we're probably just going to get this in under the wire. I mean, we've really been pushing things as a result of not having discovery and notice of this. When counsel says that we took five or six impressions, just so the record is clear--and I don't necessarily think this misstatement is material on his part--there were only those two dates in which impressions were taken and only one set of impressions was taken from the shirt.
When impressions were taken from the jeans, when he says six impressions, what he means to say, as I explained to him, is that the jeans were impressed on a single piece of paper more than once. To quote Mr. Peratis, we went, bing, bing, bing, bing, bing six times. But it was not six different occasions that these impressions were taken, but there are a total of more than one impression on a single piece of paper that's approximately 10 and a half inches by nine inches, something in that order. Now, to respond to the so-called relief that counsel is requesting, first of all, in his letter brief, counsel says that I informed him that Mr. Deedrick was going to perform experiments involving the use of Mr. Goldman's jeans and he characterizes what happened to the jeans as being an experiment and suggests that that's the way I characterized it. I specifically said to him the same thing that I'm going to say to the court right now, and that's, the taking of a test impression or exemplar is not an experiment. Whenever we conduct comparative analysis or impression--or present evidence regarding impressions, regardless of what class of evidence we're talking about, we always have to have an exemplar.
If it's handwriting, we get an exemplar of the person's handwriting. If it's a footprint, we make an impression of the shoe on a piece of paper. If it's a tool mark, we make an impression of that. If it's a rubber stamp, we make impressions of that and so on and so forth. We do that with all impression evidence. And in the case of clothing, we have to do the same thing. It's common sense, and that's also what experts will tell you. So we wanted to have these impressions, these exemplars for the purposes of them being able to perform a comparison. That is not an experiment. It is not a test of any kind. It is not a test if I took the court's finger and made an impression for the purposes of being able to compare it to some other fingerprint. That's what we do with all comparison evidence. We take impressions and that's what we did here. That's all we did here. And to characterize it as a test or an experiment is simply a complete mischaracterization of what I said to Mr. Scheck, a complete mischaracterization of what common sense and scientific experience will tell us. Now, for the requested relief of precluding us from taking these impressions or suggesting that we're somehow legally not entitled to take these impressions, we have a tremendous amount of attorneys in our legal system with the obligations of Defense attorneys and Prosecutors. Our legal system is very old. We have been conducting court trials and jury trials for about 750 years. Our common law is extremely old. And I would ask counsel to point out to the court any statute from any jurisdiction, any case law from any jurisdiction in those 750 years that suggests or implies that the Prosecution has any obligation whatsoever to refrain from investigating a case, from doing the tests that we require, experiments that we require. We don't. There is no such authority. And I think the court's orders recognize that because when your Honor made your ruling in August--on August the 26th, 1994, in discussing People versus Griffen, you said that the Prosecution must be allowed to investigate and prosecute crime, and due process does not require that it forego investigation in order to avoid destroying exculpatory evidence, citing the Griffen case. And you also said that for the proposition that the Prosecution is to be prevented from performing scientific tests to destroy evidence, that there was no authority to support that proposition, and that although it could not be condoned that your Honor was not going to decide prospectively what tests we could do and not do under the authority that counsel cites and that your Honor reviewed, in your order, if the Prosecution were to destroy exculpatory evidence in bad faith, then the court could apply a sanction retrospectively. But as the court recognized in its previous rulings on this issue in a different context--
Well, let's examine the specifics here rather than the general legal principles. What we have was testimony regarding impressions made by either the jean material or the shirt material, correct? That was from Dr. Lee.
Dr. Lee said that the jeans could not have made the impressions on the piece of paper and the envelope and also said that the shirt could not have made the impressions.
All right. So in response to that testimony, you've asked your people to test the shirt and the Levis or Levi type material to see if that is in fact true, correct?
To be compared to the impressions on the envelope and the piece of paper. In fact, that comparison was done.
All right. Now, my concern--what was raised is that--one of the issues that was raised that causes me some interest and concern is whether or not the manner in which the impressions were taken from the Levis and from the shirt in any way obscured, destroyed any of the evidence that was on there.
Well, those impressions were--some of the impressions were taken in my presence on August the 31st, and those impressions that were taken were taken from portions of the garments that did not have any observable blood or impression evidence on them. And although I believe it is possible to see a very slight yellow staining on the areas where the impressions were taken, it does not obscure, obliterate--even if it had been done on areas of the jeans that contained some blood pattern, it would not obscure or obliterate that. But it was not, your Honor. It was done from portions of the garments which are not at issue in this case, which have not been testified to and which did not contain any observable evidence in this case.
All right. The other issue I'm concerned about is whether or not you've turned over all the notes that you have in your possession concerning this exemplar taking or comparison, whatever it is you have, and the photographs.
The--it's been done in stages, your Honor, and I don't know if I'm prepared to cite all of the dates now, but it was completed by yesterday. There were notes of Ron Raquel as to his taking of the test impressions that were returned that were turned over yesterday, but I actually turned over photographs of Mr. Raquel taking the impressions and I turned over a statement from our investigator who witnessed taking the impressions significantly before then.
So since you intend on offering this testimony, what is it likely to show and what's your expectation of what Mr. Deedrick's testimony is going to be?
Your Honor, also, yesterday afternoon, Mr. Deedrick faxed me his report, faxed me the report--
--which I also sent to counsel as soon as I got it. And incidentally, I've been giving all of this information to Defense as quickly as I've received it with the exception, as Mr. Scheck indicated, of the exemplars which I immediately sent to the FBI. Those are on their way back to Los Angeles. To answer the court's question, what Mr. Deedrick is going to testify to is that he has done a comparison between the eyeglass envelope and the paper and the test impressions and that the jeans can be included as having made the impressions on those items, that the shirt can be included as having made the impressions on Ron Goldman's jeans. Your Honor, just to address the last issue of the question of--I don't know whether the court wants me to say anything further about the Prosecution's right to conduct tests, even destructive tests, because I don't think it's really all that pertinent. This is not destructive. Even if it were, we could still conduct it. And even if we destroyed exculpatory evidence, the only remedy would be for the court to look at that retrospectively; in other words, after it had been done and then impose a sanction. But I think the court recognizes or at least recognizes that prospectively, the judicial branch does not get involved in deciding what tests and what experiments the Prosecution can conduct. But I don't know whether the court needs or wants to hear anything further on that issue.
No. I just wanted to know what it was that we had here and where you're going with it.
Okay. As to notice, your Honor, I said to Mr. Scheck, first of all, when I spoke to him, "If you guys want to see the jeans, you're welcome to them. We'll arrange that. We'll be accommodating to you as we have in the past. You want to take your own impressions of it, have fun. Take impressions if you want to take impressions." And that is our position now. As for the issue--
Yes. The shirt. Your Honor, as to the issue of notice, what I said to Mr. Scheck on that score is that Mr. Deedrick is going to come in to Los Angeles. I believe he is going to be arriving here tomorrow in the late afternoon or early evening. So he may not have time to go to the Los Angeles Police Department. But as Miss Clark has indicated, it is our intention to put this evidence on very rapidly and we are trying to get everything done rapidly and we are trying to turn over discovery very rapidly so that we may do this. And we could have done this a lot faster if we had had the discovery.
Do you have any of them left? You indicated there were six impressions from the Levis.
But they're all on a single piece of paper, and that was sent to the FBI. And there's--similarly, there's a single piece of paper containing the impressions from the shirt which was also sent to the FBI. Your Honor, on the question of notice, I said to counsel we would give notice, but I did not want--I'm not--I did not want to hold anything up because I want Mr. Deedrick to take these impressions as quickly as possible from the jeans so that he can testify. For some reason, my suspicion is that counsel wants to make what I would think to be entirely inappropriate and frivolous argument that the manner in which the impressions themselves were taken is a substantive issue as to the admissibility of those impressions. I think it's frivolous because we take impressions all the time of all kinds of things. We have to do that whenever we're talking about a comparative type of analysis or impression evidence.
But if they wanted to make an issue of that, I would like Mr. Deedrick to have taken the impressions himself so that he can answer all questions and be cross-examined and examined as to how they were taken. Actually, I don't think that legally that is necessary. But if that is the direction which counsel is prepared to go--and I suspect it is--as frivolous as it may be, we want to be in a position to meet it, and we can meet it best by having Mr. Deedrick take the impressions himself. And also, it cuts down on the number of witnesses, it saves times, it cuts on the amount of direct and cross-examination.
Well, if Mr. Deedrick comes into town tomorrow, which is the 13th, late in the day, is not available to examine the items until early on the 14th, then you probably--he probably won't be available to testify until late on the 14th, correct?
Miss Clark tells me that he may be coming in earlier, in which case, if he comes in at any time prior to 5:00 o'clock, it is our intention to have him go to the Los Angeles Police Department if necessary directly from the airport in order to be able to accomplish this. So that is the People's position.
And in terms of the Defense saying they need more time to deal with this, well, you know, this is a very tiny part of Dr. Lee's testimony really. When he testified that he excluded these items of having made the impression, it only took about a minute for him to say that. I did not cross-examine him at all on that for tactical reasons, and we are putting this evidence on to rebut a minute of testimony that we could have been in a better position to confront if counsel had given us notice. They knew they were going to put this on. So I just do not see any basis whatsoever for them asking for more time to confront testimony that the People did not have an adequate opportunity to be able to fully prepare for and where we have been doing everything that we possibly can to be able to confront this testimony or to respond to this testimony as expeditiously as possible.
Your Honor, just so the court completely understands the facts, is that, as Mr. Goldberg is not conceding, we do not have these imprints from the pants and the shirt. As I should note, that from the discovery pages labeled da 5365 and 5366, on 5365, they say that with respect to the jeans, that one sample was taken from the right knee area of the jeans, the other impression was taken from the left lower rear area of the jeans. He made the impressions by taking a yellow pad and applying it to the jeans itself. So on August 21st, they indicate two impressions from the jeans and then the report says they took five samples, impressions from Goldman's jeans on August 31st. So I count seven from their reports. That's where I come up with it. They gave us one unusable picture that you see. Now, what we need to do, as I indicated, is to evaluate what they're proposing to put on, is take a look at the actual sheets of test impressions and compare that to the envelope itself and the jeans and impressions from the shirt to the jeans so our experts can have an opportunity to look at that. In terms of the timing of this, I think what I proposed is reasonable because we're going to have to get copies of what they don't have here to give us and send that out. Now, it's going to be adding even more time and it's totally unnecessary to have Mr. Deedrick make another test impression just for the purposes of him testifying alone. That's--they concede the single purpose of it. And then we would have to take that test impression and send that out to our experts and have them look at it, and it would only prolong the process, not shorten it, in terms of getting an adequate opportunity to evaluate what he's saying. So we don't have adequate discovery to deal with this. Incidentally, I would point out, Dr. Deedrick didn't turn over all experiments, all raw data, and I do want to get into that issue. Mr. Blasier briefed it. We dealt with it. That's not the point. I don't understand. I call it experiments. He doesn't like the term "Experiment." He doesn't like the word "Test." He only likes the word "Test impressions." Call it "Test impressions." The photograph that the court has from 8-21 shows that it alters the jeans. Now, I want to see the jeans myself. We want our experts to look at the jeans. We want to determine for ourselves whether or not that altered the areas that Dr. Lee testified about. And as for this absolutely extraordinary argument that this court has no power to prospectively restrict the unreasonable alteration of exculpatory evidence and that you are powerless to restrict them from doing that even though you've already issued an order saying they have to come before you and give 48 hours notice, I mean I'm--this is remarkable, that they can actually take the position, and it's the position they've been taking all along, that we have a right to--
I don't have anything new, but I would ask the court to permit us to proceed in the fashion that I've outlined. I think that what that will do is give us an opportunity to present the issues to the court for ruling on the substantial similarity of these experiments. Mr. Goldberg, even though he's talking about what we do, my information is, nobody ever heard of what Mr. Deedrick is doing before, and I would be real curious to see if he's ever done imprints made in blood with two different fabrics on these receiving surfaces in the fashion he's done in this case. I suspect he's never done this before.
All right. But we're talking about a pattern impression here of a fabric. So this is not exactly rocket science.
KEY QUOTEWhoa, whoa. We're talking about imprints in blood, fabric on fabric, jeans on to a shirt and then jeans on to envelopes. We just want to see what he's done, but imprints in blood.
KEY QUOTEYour Honor, logistically, I should let the court know, Mr. Deedrick will be in tomorrow. He should be arriving by--in this court building by about 11:30. And what we can do--
He will. I also propose this. That they have Mr. Deedrick do the impressions, meet in court, and then they can have their expert here to examine everything Mr. Deedrick has done, question him about it and then everybody can be ready to proceed on Thursday.
Your Honor, Mr. Morton, I called him and asked him when he would be available. He's got a court appearance. He won't be available until Thursday. He's canceling another court appearance so he can get here Thursday, and they told me he would be here tomorrow afternoon. And we object. We want a ruling that he not be allowed to make any other impressions until we see all these objects and have an opportunity to brief the Griffen question and from the--
No. No. As I'm indicating, we don't know what the jeans look like. I can't adequately present them.
All right. Thank you, counsel. All right. The Prosecution is ordered to make available for inspection by the Defense and their experts, if such be available, the test impressions currently in the possession of Mr. Deedrick. That's to be accomplished no later than, assuming airplane connections, no later than noon tomorrow. The issue of fabric impressions was raised by the Defense. The court notes that both sides have had access to both the jeans and the shirt. Either side had the opportunity anytime they wanted since June of 1994 to take any impressions in whatever manner they wanted. The Defense had prior opportunity to look at these items. It's apparent from Dr. Lee's testimony that he did in fact examine carefully the fabric patterns of both these items. Defense experts have had access to it. I find no discovery violation. Objections are overruled.
Your Honor, we need time to--if they're going to deliver these test impressions to us tomorrow, I have no expert to look at them. I have to take--I have to make copies of them in a way that is usable for the experts. I have to send them out, and I don't believe I'll be able to cross-examine this witness until Monday.
Well, counsel, the issue was raised by your witness. So your witness has already seen the impressions, knows about these impressions.
You can have the opportunity to look at it. Counsel, I've directed that. All right. That's the end of that issue.
So it seems to me that there is an issue here that we will have to litigate with respect to a bad faith alteration of exculpatory evidence. I mean, this is a classic because there was an outstanding order.
this is a railroad, and there has--this has to stop because this is completely inconsistent with the discovery law in this state, inconsistent with positions they've taken.
To quote Mr. Peratis, we went, bing, bing, bing, bing, bing six times. But it was not six different occasions that these impressions were taken.
we're talking about a pattern impression here of a fabric. So this is not exactly rocket science.
Whoa, whoa. We're talking about imprints in blood, fabric on fabric, jeans on to a shirt and then jeans on to envelopes. We just want to see what he's done, but imprints in blood.