All right. Back on the record in the Simpson matter. All parties are again present. We have three matters to take up, a Prosecution motion for additional discovery, a Prosecution motion to quash subpoenas served upon certain Deputy District Attorneys and District Attorney employees and a motion by the ACLU on behalf of certain press interests regarding transcripts. Let's take up the discovery motion first.

Good morning, your Honor.

Good afternoon.

I'm sorry. Good afternoon.

Good afternoon, Miss Lewis. Time flies, huh?

I was going to say that, but I didn't think it--well, I'll keep my opinion on whether that was warranted to myself. Your Honor, we have on several occasions already appeared before this Court with empty hands, empty of the Defense discovery with formal motions asking the Defense yet again to give up what the reciprocal discovery law tells us we have a right to, and we're here once again for that purpose; and I'm here to talk about not just experts' reports, but discovery with regard to lay witnesses as well. Now, first of all, with regard to experts' reports, this Court has admonished the Defense repeatedly throughout this case that it was skeptical of the lack of experts' reports, that if it discovered or it came to light that their reports either existed or that the experts had somehow been told not to write reports when they otherwise would normally prepare reports, the Court has repeatedly admonished the Defense that severe sanctions would be imposed. Now, the Defense already for the first time or the first most egregious time back during opening statements failed to disclose discovery, which the Court found that failure to be an intentional and flagrant violation of the discovery laws and an intentional one, that they did that for a tactical advantage. That was back in January, January 30th I think was when the Court issued its order in that regard. Even after the Court at that time ordered the immediate disclosure of experts' reports, we had to come again with, you know, palms open and hands empty asking this Court to compel them to do what it already ordered they do. Now, what they did was say that there was some dispute over the extent of experts' reports, now, some minor issue that could have been resolved without us having to wait weeks for discovery without getting it and then have to bring yet another formal motion. That finally got some action on their part. Apparently that's what caused them to go to the Court in camera to determine what they had to turn over. At some point after that, we got rough notes from a number of their experts, rough notes of observations. Still no reports. Now, we're here again, your Honor, and the Court admonished the Defense--the last time I believe was May 30th when you told them at sidebar that if they--if it turns out that they were in the wrong and not providing us reports, their experts would not testify.

And given their demonstrated failure to abide by discovery laws on several occasions in the past, I think suspicion is warranted, and we are very suspicious. We believe that there are reports that either exist that we should be getting that we're not getting or that their experts have been called off of writing them somehow. Now, along these lines, your Honor, I do want to point out that the Court seems to feel that there is something improper about the Prosecution--I'm not sure I'm accurate in saying this, so I want to be careful, but there seems to be something improper in the Prosecution contacting Defense expert witnesses. Now, once they place an expert witness on their witness list, which, for example, they had done with Dr. Rieders back in October of 1994, once they do that, the reason for doing that is that it triggers the reciprocal discovery obligations. It certainly triggers our right to contact that expert, and that's what this whole area of reciprocal discovery is about. So we feel somewhat constrained and we're in a difficult position. Are we allowed to contact experts whose reports we have not gotten or are we not?

So long as they're on the witness list, the law I submit gives us the right to contact those experts and we should be contacting those experts. But the Defense wants to argue out of both sides of its mouth saying that, "Well, we're not going to have them write reports," or, "We don't have reports to give you, and in the meantime, you're engaged in prosecutorial misconduct somehow if you fail--if you try and contact those experts if--at all." So they can't have it both ways, your Honor. This is a period and a time and an age of reciprocal discovery. They cannot continue to shield their experts. There is one flaw, fatal flaw in reasoning which the Defense still insists on engaging in, and it applies not just to expert witnesses, but to civilian or lay witnesses as well. And that is--let me start by saying that once they have placed these witnesses on their witness list, they have demonstrated under the language of footnote 11 and Izzazaga that it is reasonably likely that they anticipate calling those experts at trial. Now, that happens as a matter of law. And once that happens, that is what triggers their discovery obligation.

There have been statements made in the course of the last few months by Mr. Blasier, Mr. Scheck and others that demonstrate apparent ignorance or an unwillingness to follow that mandate because they still--they still demonstrate the subjective intent idea where if they end up not calling a witness, an expert witness or any other witness at trial, then they don't have to provide discovery. But they've missed the whole point of reciprocal discovery. While the reciprocal discovery is not designed to force them to call a witness to trial, it is designed to provide the Prosecution with an understanding and a full knowledge and opportunity to cross-examine intelligibly because we have knowledge of their prior reports and what they basically would testify to. Now, they do get the final decision whether they don't call that witness at trial, and that assumes, of course, that this Court does not preclude them because of discovery violations for making that decision. But that doesn't mean they can withhold the discovery for those experts who still to this day remain on their witness list. When it comes to experts, to this day, with the exception of a report, a four-page report from Dr. Gerdes, which we did get this week on Monday or Tuesday, with the exception of that, we still have not gotten a report from any of these numerous experts that they discussed in length in opening statement and have been the subject of two or three previous motions to compel their discovery. We still do not have those. Now--

Do you feel I need to go beyond the previous order?

I do, your Honor. I believe at this point in time, there is good cause considering the past findings of this Court and the past orders of the Court with regard to discovery to force the Defense to make an affirmative showing that they are not doing something underhanded or unethical with regard to their discovery obligations to force them to show that they are indeed complying with the law in this regard. The Court's earlier finding with regard to the failure of the Defense to turn over the witnesses that Mr. Cochran mentioned during opening statement indicates that they were not--that they are not unwilling to engage in that kind of conduct, and that was what we started off with back in January where they intentionally withheld, and the Court made a finding that they intentionally withheld discovery on those witnesses for no good legal, ethical reason, but only to gain a tactical advantage. And the Court issued some strong sanctions in response to that in terms of allowing us to reopen and admonishing the jury, and those sanctions were appropriate. Now, your Honor, we've been--I've been before this Court a number of times on this issue. I've never yet before now--and I am asking now for you to preclude them from calling any expert for whom we do not have a report and for whom they cannot provide a satisfactory explanation and that the Court believes and the Court gives credibility to as to why they don't have that report and whether they're getting that report and when they're going to get that report, because it's been on the table now for months and months that these experts would normally--it's everyone's expectation that an expert writes the report. That's what everyone expects, the Prosecution--and I won't speak for the Defense, but that is the expectation. Now, if I may, I want to mention there's a problem with regard to civilian witnesses or lay witnesses. The Prosecution and the Defense early on in this case had an informal agreement that we would not exchange attorneys notes of witnesses. That agreement was not to my knowledge--and I've looked and thought about this--it was never finalized or formalized I should say with regard to the Defense's obligation to provide witness statements that their attorneys took as opposed to their investigators. Now, we, on the other hand, the Prosecution did because of global discovery demands enter into an understanding with the Defense, which we embodied in a document which we gave the Court a copy of earlier and which I've included the relevant page for and appendix to the brief, we did formalize that aspect of discovery whereby the Prosecuting attorneys did not have to turn over their attorneys' notes of witnesses. The reason for that and the common sense behind it and the reason why that is okay, that we are asking for their notes, even though we're not turning over ours, is because in every instance where a witness has testified, they have--we have had a police detective or a D.A. investigator interview that witness and write it up in a statement form, coherent statement, and have given that to the Defense so that they have that. So they had no need for attorneys' notes. On the other hand, there are a lot of civilian as opposed to expert lay witnesses which the Defense has failed to give us any information on at all. And there are also in addition to that approximately 10 or 11 witnesses for whom they have provided only rough notes.

And I made a copy of those and I know I appended one to our brief, but I did make a full--I believe it's a full set for the Court's perusal with regard to the other witnesses that I did append to the brief to show the Court just how loose these notes are and how unreliable they are. We cannot rely on these. We cannot rely on these in either of two ways. One, we can't rely on them for notice of what the witness is even going to say. Most of them--many of them do not even include relevant dates or time periods or what it is exactly they're alleging. You have to try and read between the lines. So there's an obvious due process problem which is not satisfied by these notes and which does not satisfy the discovery statute. In addition, there is the problem that we do not have anything concrete upon which to cross-examine these witnesses for whom we've been provided either no discovery or these rough notes. We cannot expect a witness to testify consistent with something that is incomprehensible. And so, therefore, if the witness testifies differently from what they said, we're not going to know it because you cannot tell from these notes. Therefore, there's nothing in these notes with which we can impeach them.

So they provide almost nothing. The only thing it gives us is some rough idea of the nature of the subject matter of the testimony. It does not tell us what they would say, what their statement would be, what it is that they believe to be the truth that they would testify to. So for the Defense on the one hand to say, "Well, we have this agreement where we're not going to give you attorneys' notes," but on the other hand, either withhold discovery entirely on many witnesses or give us only these inadequate, indecipherable rough notes with regard to these 10 or 12 witnesses, it's just not fair. They just don't come into court in equity with clean hands and be able to force us to abide by that early and formal agreement because they have not abided by the discovery laws and the spirit of that agreement, whereas we have in providing them witness statements from police or D.A. investigators with regard to all these witnesses. So we believe, your Honor, with regard to the lay witnesses or nonexpert witnesses, they should be required to either have their investigator write a compre--a coherent I should say and understandable, intelligent, understandable statement with regard to what these witnesses would say or give up their notes. I mean, they cannot shield themselves with this informal agreement we had earlier when they're using it to violate the discovery laws. I have to bring to the Court's attention one final matter which is not discussed in the brief. Mr. Douglas and I had been discussing the availability of certain photographs and certain negatives of photographs, and I believe we may have--apparently we've reached an impasse with regard to them. There were photographs provided to the Prosecution which included those taken at Mr. Kardashian's house on the 17th as well as those taken at Dr. Huizenga's I believe it's pronounced office on the 15th. Now, those photographs--

Haven't you been provided copies?

We've been provided copies I guess as far as we know of all those photographs, but apparently they were lumped together. The other day, I came down and asked Mr. Douglas and Mr. Shapiro, who was the only other Defense attorney who they thought would be knowledgeable on that, to try and separate out those which were taken at Mr. Kardashian's house from those that were taken at Dr. Huizenga's. And they--Mr. Douglas and Mr. Shapiro were able to do so with regard to about two-thirds of those photographs. There still remain a set or a bunch of them with which they could not distinguish.

Consequently, we asked--I asked if we could be provided with the negatives of Dr. Huizenga's photos. The reason for that request is because we had previously been informed, apparently I'm told that they had lost the negatives of the photographs taken at Kardashian's house, Mr. Kardashian's house. So consequently, if we got Dr. Huizenga to bring in his file which presumably would have the negatives that he took so that we could go through the negatives and, one, make copies for ourselves off of the negatives, which would provide much clearer pictures of the Defendant's cuts and so forth than do the photos--apparently photos of photos which we have. So, one, for that purpose and, two, for the other purpose of separating out so that we would know exactly which photos were taken at which location on which day, because as it stands, they were all given to us--apparently given to us together. Lastly, your Honor, there were discovery documents given to us which we acknowledge receiving last Tuesday on the 20th. Included within those documents are handwritten notes from Dr. Henry Lee which were made apparently on April 2nd, 1995. That's when they're dated, and they're notes of his observations apparently and perhaps other observations--that's what they appear to be--of various aspects of the socks which are in issue in this case as well as--apparently they have--some have to do with the Bruno Magli shoes as well. Throughout this discovery is mentioned that photographs were taken including and of a particular importance that--this says photomicro--micrograph. So apparently there were microphotos taken is what I'm trying to get to, and we have not seen those and we believe we have the right to those. And we may have a disagreement about that. I believe we probably do have a disagreement about that. I broached the subject on that particular issue before lunch today and I think we do have a disagreement. But whether or not the Defense intends to offer those photos as real evidence at trial, I think if they--given their place within all these observations of apparently Dr. Lee, we have a right to those photos as part of the observations of experts and notes of observations of experts. And we have received many photos in this case along similar lines where apparently photos which were taken during the course of an examination from an expert--by an expert were turned over to us. So that is our position on that.

But once again--and I'm tired of coming before this court. I'm sure that the Court is tired of hearing me. I'm sounding like a broken record with regard to our frustration at having the Defense flagrantly--what appears to us to be flagrant violations of the discovery laws because we have simply not gotten what one would expect given all the reciprocal discovery laws, mandates and the case law following it and what the magnitude of this case would dictate.

Thank you. Mr. Uelmen.

Thank you, your Honor. I can state without equivocation, without reservation that all reports that are in existence for any of the experts on our witness list and we intend to call as witnesses at this trial have been turned over.

So the only expert witness you intend on calling at this point is Dr. Gerdes?

That's not what I said, your Honor. I said all reports in existence prepared by any of the experts we intend to call have been turned over. Some of the reports that we--some of the experts that we intend to call have not prepared reports and we have not requested them to prepare reports. And that I think is where we part company with the Prosecution's interpretation of the reciprocal discovery law. Reference has been made to the whole point of reciprocal discovery. The whole point of reciprocal discovery is simply acceleration, not disgorgement. The whole point of reciprocal discovery is to make available to the other side the materials that you have prepared in putting your own case together that you are going to put on as evidence in the presentation of your case in chief. The discovery law does not impose any obligation to prepare reports or statements. It simply requires the turning over of the reports and statements that are prepared in the routine of the preparation of your case. Now, Miss Lewis has stated everyone's expectation is that experts write reports. I'm afraid that's just not true. That is not everyone's expectation. In fact, the prevailing practice among many, many Defense experts is that they will not prepare reports unless they are specifically requested to prepare reports. Now, your Honor, of course, is aware of the Sara case. We're aware of it too, in which a Court held that for a Defense lawyer to instruct a witness whose routine practice was to prepare a report not to prepare a report, specifically to avoid having to turn that report over in the course of reciprocal discovery was contempt. But that case did not hold that there was any obligation for the Defense to make sure that a report is prepared by every witness that they intend to call as an expert witness. And quite to the contrary--

Let me ask you this. Forgive me for interrupting you. But it would be my impression--let's take, for example, Dr. Lee. That it's the practice of Dr. Lee and his office in the state of Connecticut to routinely prepare reports in the cases that they consult on and the cases that they assist the state authorities in that state to prepare for trial.

I think Dr. Lee will speak to the contrary on that point, that when he is retained by the Defense as a consultant, he does not prepare reports unless they are requested. And Dr. Lee is an excellent example because his relationship has been an on-going consulting one in which he is frequently consulted as the evidence develops on an on-going basis by the lawyers representing Mr. Simpson for the Defense. It is not the practice to require him to put into a written report the results of all of his consultation. And at this point, we have not even made a determination yet as to what issues Dr. Lee will be called to actually testify as an expert witness.

So the discovery law doesn't say to the Defense you have to prepare reports. It simply says you have to turn over the reports that you do prepare. So the question--and again, in our moving papers, we have cited a case from the ninth circuit, incidentally, the same court that decided the Sara case, the case of United States versus Peters, in which the court reversed the imposition of sanctions of excluding an expert because a report had not been produced on the grounds that a report had not been prepared. And under the federal discovery law, which closely parallels the California reciprocal discovery law, there is simply no ruling by any court at any time that a court has authority to order the preparation of a report so that it can be turned over. And there's good reason for that, your Honor. If that were the case, if the reciprocal discovery law were to say to the Defense, you have to produce reports and statements so that they can be turned over to the Prosecution for their use, we would seriously run afoul I think of the protections of due process. The whole concept of reciprocal discovery is not based on turning the Defense into agents who are supposed to assist the Prosecution in investigating the case and making evidence available to them. The whole concept is simply, we want to accelerate the process and say to the Defense, if you're going to put this stuff on in your case, then you're going to waive whatever privilege protects it anyway. Therefore, you might as well turn it over now so that we don't have to delay the trial, so that the Prosecution doesn't get this stuff when the witness is actually called to the witness stand. The extent I think of the Prosecution's misconception of the reciprocal discovery obligation is implicit in their position, in their moving papers that simply putting a witness on the witness list means that automatically the Defense has to turn over anything obtained from that witness even if they thereafter elect not to call that witness as a witness. That somehow, just putting the name on the list works as a total waiver of any privilege that might protect the information that that witness later turns over to the Defense. And that is simply not the law. In fact, that position was explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeal in the Rodriguez case that we have cited, in which the court held that even after you put your witnesses on the list, at the time a later report is produced, that report may be excised to exclude privileged material as to which that witness is not going to testify.

And the woods case, which is the only case cited by the Prosecution for this remarkable proposition, held that in that case, because the Defense had turned over a report, at that point, the contents of that report were waived. Now, I'm not suggesting that we have reports that we're sitting on waiting to see what our experts are going to actually be called to testify to. We concede that as long as our experts remain on the witness list and we receive reports and our intent is to put those experts on the stand to testify as to the information in those reports, those reports have to be turned over as soon as we receive them. And we are certainly going to do that. But if at any point we decide to withdraw an expert and not have that expert testify, at that point, any reciprocal discovery obligation disappears, because the only purpose of the reciprocal discovery obligation is to accelerate the presentation of what is actually going to be presented by putting the witness on the stand. It is not to make available to the Prosecution some sort of windfall of new information that they might then put to use in terms of supporting their own flailing case in chief. With respect to the rough notes of the witness statements, we have turned over the rough notes because that's all we have. And again, there's no obligation that we instruct our investigators to go out and interview a witness and prepare a statement simply so that statement can be turned over to the Prosecution if we don't need the statement in order to prepare our own presentation of that witness. So again, it's a consistent position in that respect. We have been accused of playing fast and loose with the reciprocal discovery law. And quite to the contrary, your Honor, I think all of the cases that have interpreted this law has sent warning signals that we are treading on very dangerous thin ice from the perspective of the Defense lawyer's obligation to protect the privileges that encompass the presentation of or preparation of evidence for the Defense and to proceed with great caution in terms of what you turn over, because once you turn it over, it's a waiver and the cases make that quite clear. Once you turn it over the--whether you put the witness on or not, you have--you have waived the privilege. So it's incumbent on the Defense to very carefully look at what we're turning over. And we are proceeding on that basis and we have turned over all of the reports that we have received from the experts that we have on our witness list and intend to call as witnesses in the Defense case.

There may be witnesses who are on our witness list who will not be called. But the fact remains, until we have received a report and we intend to present that witness to produce the results of that report, there is no obligation to turn that report over to the Prosecution. And there is no authority--

Wouldn't you say we probably cross that line when you issue a subpoena or have an agreement for that person to appear beyond call as a witness?

You know, I'm not even sure that a subpoena crosses the line in terms of--

Isn't that likely?

--requiring that witness prepare a report. What I'm saying is, even up to the point that they've taken the stand and been sworn, there is no obligation that they prepare a report simply so that it can be turned over to the other side. If we're prepared to put our witnesses on without reports knowing that there's a risk, certainly they can get up and cross-examine and they can say to our experts, "Doctor, did you prepare a report?" "No."

"You mean you did all of this investigation and came to these conclusions without ever writing a report?" "Yes." And they can compare that expert testimony to the expert testimony that they presented and suggest to the jury that this expert presented by the Defense perhaps is less credible because he didn't prepare a report. That's certainly an avenue that is open to them. But what I'm saying is, that's a decision that is our decision, and the law does not in any way implicate our right to make that decision to saying that we are prepared to put our experts on without having required them to prepare reports. Finally, we would note that everyone's expectation that experts write reports, Dr. Lakshmanan never prepared a report. I think we're dealing here with a case in which the recent developments indicate just how fluid and dynamic the tactical decisions facing the lawyers trying this case are and how in many cases, those decisions are going to change as the evidence comes in. So it's certainly not our expectation that all experts write reports and it should not be the expectation of the Prosecution as well.

All right. Any brief response, Miss Lewis?

Yes, your Honor. Thank you. The Defense is still laboring under this misconception. This is where we radically depart from the meaning of the discovery laws. They're under this assumption that they can wait until they finally decisively actually call Mr. Witness X, Dr. X to the stand before they have to conclusively--before they've conclusively decided they are going to call that expert and therefore turn over a report. And again, when Mr. Uelmen talks about not knowing exactly what subject matter Dr. Lee is going to testify to, that--he's making that same argument again. And that argument cannot be the law because every Defense attorney in every case could argue that and could thwart the whole purpose of reciprocal discovery when it comes to experts. There's a real problem with that attitude and I don't think it flows--I think it's a matter of law. The law is to the contrary once they put the witness on the witness list. They've done that--

Do you have a case that says that?

Well, under Izzazaga, footnote 11, when they reasonably anticipate calling a witness at trial I think--

Do you have a case that interprets that phrase?

No. I don't believe there is one in California. But I think--

So how can it be so clear? And is there a federal case that has an analogous statute or the Oregon statute that has a case that says that that's what reasonably likely to call.

No, your Honor. The Parker case that Mr. Uelmen alluded to which relied on the federal rules as well as a Hawaii statute, the wording of that statute which the court interpreted the plain--plain meaning of explains that decision. The federal rules as well as the Hawaii local rule in terms of discovery of experts' reports provide that the Defendant shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph the following. Then they list experts' reports and so forth. And what the ninth circuit said in the Parker case is, because the statute says it shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph it, it must have been making reference to something tangible already in written form, and hence there is no obligation under that statute to reduce an oral communication to writing.

We don't have--our statute is not worded the same. Consequently, its plain meaning is different from the plain meaning of the wording of this statute. They're not analogous. In addition to the statements of expert that our discovery statutes talk about, they talk about the Defense having to provide the results--

No. Excuse me. Maybe--I obviously didn't make myself clear. My question was reasonably likely to call as a witness, what triggers that standard? What is that standard? Is it when a subpoena is issued? Is it when the actual witness list is prepared? Do you have any case authority that defines that term?

I don't have any--there is no authority that I'm aware of that specifically delves into that issue. In woods, however, the court does address it--the court addresses the Defense argument. I don't--there is no case I believe in California that specifically defines that yet, that discovery law still being interpreted.

I am wondering if you found anything in the federal or Oregon statute.

I have not. I have not, your Honor.

All right.

The woods case--in the woods case, you know, it's still right on point where it says: "Finally, the Defense protests the vice of acceleration is that disclosure must be made solely to preserve the option of calling the witness even though not all reasonably anticipated witnesses are actually called to the stand. "At least--as such--" excuse me--"At least, in the case of confidential statements," the public defender in woods argues, "There should be no waiver until the expert testifies." And the Court of Appeal in woods held, "We sympathize with the position, but cannot accept the argument as a general proposition without doing damage to the statutory objectives of ascertaining the truth, saving time in trial, avoiding the necessity of postponements and protecting against undue delay."

So the Court of Appeal--the policy behind requiring the Defense to disclose those witnesses that reasonably anticipates calling at trial is to require that discovery to be turned over. So while there's no case which construes it specifically as far as what the Court is talking about, there is the whole policy of the law and the policy is explicated as it is in woods and other cases. I'm reminded apparently that there have been Defense experts going on national television saying they will testify in this case. I seem to recall Dr. Lenore Walker saying that on the Larry King Live show.

Have you received any of the underlying testing information that was discussed?

We did, your Honor. Shortly after the Court ordered it, we received very informally or maybe it was formal--we did receive--we have received the raw data of the testing results. We have never yet received any kind of report from Dr. Walker with regard to her analysis or interpretation or anything of that data. And we are wondering why isn't that forthcoming. If she's bragging on national TV how she's going to be testifying in this case, surely she must have an idea what she's going to be testifying to. So, your Honor, the discovery law requires this disclosure so that those things can happen which it seems to promote, and that is the ascertainment of truth to save time from delays happening or are necessitated because of the failure to proceed timely discovery. So all those things warrant the Court finding that by placing these witnesses on their witness list, they did that for the purpose of preserving their right to call them. So, therefore, it demonstrated as a factual matter that they reasonably anticipated calling them for trial. I've argued that my reading of the statute that should be as a matter of law, but it's also as a factual matter, and the Court can so find with regard to this case that they made that factual determination. Otherwise, why would they put those witnesses on their witness list? They clearly did so because they wanted to preserve the option of calling them because it was reasonably anticipated, and that's the loose language of Izzazaga. It's not strict language. It's very loose language. They reasonably anticipated calling them at trial. It was likely they would call them at trial.

And Izzazaga does establish the standard to that extent, that it allows for a loser standard than near certainty or certainty that Mr. Uelmen argues to this Court should be required before they have to disclose statements. Now, when they talk about civilian notes and so forth, oddly enough, throughout most of the several months of the beginning of this case, the Defense was--when they eventually provided them--we didn't get them timely. But when they finally gave us witnesses' statements, their investigators were able to write coherent statements. Many of them were short and to the point. They were not--most of them, the ones that we have gotten, are not lengthy detailed, complicated things for an investigator to write out. So it strikes us as suspicious and it is suspicious that why is it now suddenly with these last 10 or 12 witnesses that we get all these rough notes on? Why are we only getting rough notes now if that's the general practice and procedure? Why haven't they been doing that all along? They've been writing statements all along and their investigators have been writing statements of witnesses all along, and we are getting only their rough notes which are incoherent and we're unable to rely on them.

So we believe we deserve more, your Honor. I'm here again with my palms open asking the Court to please enforce the discovery laws and require the Defense to do what the law obligates them to do.

All right. Thank you, counsel. I accept as a premise in this matter Mr. Uelmen's representation to the Court at this time that all expert witness reports that have been produced and that are in the possession of either the expert witness themselves or in the possession of Defense counsel have been turned over to the Prosecution of those witnesses that they intend to call, that the Defense intends on calling. I've always--excuse me. I have already expressed to counsel my skepticism that so many Defense witnesses would not prepare reports, especially given the national stature of so many of these witnesses. It seems unlikely to me that that's the case. However, I do acknowledge that this trial has been very dynamic and very fluid in the way that it has progressed and that things change day to day, moment to moment. And I can see clearly strategy shifting on both sides.

So whether or not a final determination has been made to call a particular witness, I can as a former trial lawyer understand that that decision changes from day to day. The Prosecution--. Miss Lewis, you make the argument that I should look to the policy and the spirit of the statute and enforce the policy and the spirit. The problem is, the policy and the spirit is for the Appellate Courts to determine, not for the trial court. I'm bound by the particular language of the statute, and as a trial court Judge, I can't go beyond the statutory language. There are many flaws in 1054 of the Penal Code, and I suspect one of the outcomes of this particular case, no matter what the outcome will be, a legislative change in 1054 that will statutorily require the preparation of reports. But that's not supported by the case law and it's not supported by the statute. The Court's previous order does direct the Defense to turn over all reports as soon as they become available. That order stands. And I previously warned the Defense that if expert witnesses are called and if I find that there's been a subterfuge, those witnesses will be precluded. That ruling stands.

Thank you, your Honor.