All right. We have three matters to take up at this point, the motion to reconsider, the Riechardt motion, discovery issue regarding the gloves and I understand Dr.--and a few scheduling matters. All right. Mr. Douglas, good morning.

Your Honor, good morning. I would like to argue the motion that we filed, which is our motion to allow Mr. Simpson to exercise his constitutional right to present a defense. Your Honor, I think that given this Court's inherent broad discretion to control the administration of evidence, that there's little question that the Court has the ability to hear this matter at this time. I think that a review of the totality of the evidence that is currently in evidence shows that there is very slight evidence that Mr. Simpson had a motive to commit these crimes, and I think that, as far as I can recall, the only evidence of motive that we've been privy to in this case is some theory that the death of Nicole Brown Simpson was in some way a final act of control that Mr. Simpson chose to exercise after sharing a hamburger at McDonald's with Mr. Kaelin. Since, your Honor, there is only slight circumstantial evidence in the record supporting that theory, I think that Mr. Simpson should be permitted to introduce evidence of another possible motive which is every bit as plausible and every bit as compelling as that which the jury has already been permitted to hear. Your Honor, I don't want to take up the Court's time to recount verbatim the offer of proof that Mr. Cochran offered when this matter was heard perhaps 10 days ago, but I do think that when you consider and when you weigh the evidence of motive that is currently in the record, that it is apparent that we're not talking about a People versus Hall matter. That is, we're not trying to offer circumstantial evidence that there were certain unknown third parties who were identified who may in fact have been responsible to commit these dastardly crimes. But rather, I think that we should be given latitude to rebut the current inference in the record, that the only motive that the jury has been allowed to hear that anyone in this world of ours would have had to have committed these crimes is this slight circumstantial evidence that Mr. Simpson was carrying out some final act of control. I think, your Honor, given the facts that Detective Lange has already admitted to, given the fact that there is little question that Miss Resnick was involved in drugs in the days preceding the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson, given the fact that it is beyond dispute that there was an intervention that took place where her close friends gathered to confront her with her drug involvement, that certainly there is every bit as plausible and as compelling another motive. Certainly there is evidence that should be offered and allowed to be introduced to rebut the thin strands that are now in front of the jury suggesting that the only possible reason why this crime could have been committed was because of some act of control. I think, your Honor, that it's important to weigh the state of the record. I think that there can be reasonable limits placed on the extent of Mr. Riechardt's testimony, but I do think, your Honor, that there is sufficient basis for the Court to exercise its discretion to allow for the introduction of his testimony.

What limits would you suggest when you say "Certain limits"?

I think, your Honor, that it would be permissible that Mr. Riechardt can discuss the nature of his past relationship with her, reasons why he believes she was using drugs, reasons why he believes that she was no longer welcomed in his home and the dates of that, the circumstances of the intervention that occurred, certain reasons why he believes in fact that she was using cocaine and how it was discovered and how he happened to see it. I do not think, and I can appreciate the Court ruling that he would not be allowed to testify concerning any theory that there were Colombian hit men or any theory that she owed money, a particular sum to a particular person.

But isn't that the base--I mean, isn't that a fundamental part that's sort of missing in the offer of proof, that she owed money, a substantial amount of money that would cause this act to occur?

I think, your Honor, that there is circumstantial evidence that can be permitted and that is admissible that would allow for an adequate inference of that because she was not gainfully employed at the time, she was not receiving any support from Christian Riechardt. He will testify to those two things. She was using drugs. She was using drugs to such an extent that her dearest friends saw the need to confront her. She was placed into a drug program. I think, your Honor, that--

Your offer does not include any information regarding the amount of drugs we're talking about here.

My offer does not include any information as to the amount of drugs. My offer does not include any information as to precisely whom the drugs were purchased from, the nature of the consignment, if at all, the nature of those arrangements, correct.

Okay.

But I do think, your Honor, that given the contrary state of the evidence, given what I suggest to be the far from compelling evidence of motive--and I recognize that motive is not an element of the case that must be proven. But given that which the Court has allowed to be introduced, that in fairness, there should be some room for balance, there should be some room for some latitude, and I'm asking for a limited window to allow certain pieces of evidence. Perhaps the circumstances, your Honor, the fact that there was an intervention days before, five days before the death I think is important evidence. I think it is compelling evidence. Perhaps the Court would not allow Mr. Riechardt to talk about the reasons why he saw fit to sleep with a gun in his bed because he feared that there'd be drug killers looking for him. I can understand if the Court wanted to put limits down on that regard, but I do think that in reason and with some consideration, that the Court can fashion a narrow appropriate window that adequately enables the Defense to rebut. And, again, the crux of my argument is that we seek to rebut that which the jury has been allowed to hear thus far.

All right. Thank you, Mr. Douglas. Miss Lewis.

Thank you, your Honor. Good morning.

Good morning.

Your Honor, there is no basis for a motion to reconsider here. In the civil arena, the statute requires that even for a motion to reconsider to be brought, it requires newly discovered facts and a reason, an explanation why the proponent of the evidence didn't discover those facts before. There's no formal provision even for that in the criminal law, though if there was something vastly different in analogous to what the code of civil procedure requires, I'm sure the Court would hear it. In this situation, Mr. Cochran made lengthy offers of proof to the Court in chambers apparently, which I was not present to hear, as well as out here in open court on the record. The court issue a very detailed, considered ruling on this issue, and there's simply no reason to change it now. What Mr. Douglas tries to argue is that it would just go to rebut this narrow portion of the People's case, and that is motive elements, which he concedes we need not prove motive in any murder case to the jury, though evidence may be admitted for them to consider, and we have admitted evidence here. But whenever you're talking about the possibility of some third party committing the crime, you are talking about the Defense seeking to rebut some portion of the Prosecution's case, whether it's motive or other evidence of identity. So there's nothing novel in his argument. He's just saying, "We want to use it for this purpose," which is just one of the purposes that third party capability case law addresses. The Court is on very, very, as you know, solid legal ground in this ruling and I submit would almost be an abuse of discretion to do otherwise, to allow in evidence here, because, Judge, one of the important things that I want to make sure is understood, even if there was evidence--and there has never been an offer from the Defense that there is any evidence--but even if there was evidence that Faye Resnick owed a drug supplier money, that is mere motive evidence, and that's not enough to link somebody to the actual perpetration of the crime, which is what Hall and those other cases require. So even if they did come up to that level, which they don't, that's what the case law says is not enough. There has to be a direct evidentiary link, not mere motive in a third party. And if they had an identified party, which they don't, and they concede that they don't and seem to think it works in their favor--it works against them because they've not even identified a third party. But even if they had an identified third party and they had evidence that she owed that third party, drug seller, perhaps money, that--all of that is just motive evidence. It's still not the evidentiary link that Hall and the case law coming in after it throughout the 1990's require. So, no. 1, there's no basis for a motion to reconsider. If the Court is indeed, for technical reasons, granting the motion to reconsider and reconsidering its ruling, there's been nothing in the offer of proof or in the argument of counsel for the Court to change its ruling, and there's been a notable absence of any case law cited this morning by the Defense this morning in this attempt as well.

Briefly, your Honor.

Briefly.

There certainly, your Honor, are broader areas that the Defense could seek to offer through Mr. Riechardt that we will not that would be able to more closely track the quality of the proof that has been offered by the People. But I think when the Court considers the context of our motion, it's fair to compare it with that which has already been allowed to be introduced. Your Honor, we don't want to use Christian Riechardt to talk about the frequency at which Faye Resnick and others and Nicole Brown Simpson would go out, would use drugs and would party and how Mr. Simpson was never a part of that or the reasons why Mr. Riechardt would believe that Mr. Simpson was not trying to control Miss Brown Simpson in the days before the murder or the nature and the circumstances of the relationship between Mr. Simpson and his ex-wife in the months and the weeks before which would all point directly against a claim that Mr. Simpson was trying to control Nicole Brown Simpson, particularly, your Honor, as it came to the more relevant times, that is the days and the weeks before the murder. But we do think, your Honor, that given the evidence that has been allowed to be introduced, given, for example, that the Court has found it relevant that an 1989 incident would suggest that Mr. Simpson has a certain mindset such that he is capable of committing the crime in June of `94, given the state of the record that certain other things that occurred in `93 are relevant to what happened on June the 12th of `94, we believe strongly that Mr. Simpson should be allowed narrowly, if the Court chooses to exercise its discretion, carving out a niche. But I do think that there is adequate bases and adequate grounds given the current record to allow for some introduction of facts that are germaine, that are pointed and that directly contradict the theory that the jury is currently left with, that there's only one possible motive and that that motive is that Mr. Simpson was exercising a final act of control. That's not the way that the evidence should be. That's not the way that a fair jury should be allowed to consider. If we are talking about a search for truth and having the jury fully apprised of everything that was really going on at 875 South Bundy, we think that exercise of fairness should allow for the introduction of this evidence.

All right. Thank you, counsel. All right. Counsel, I need to review one or two cases before I rule on this matter, and I'll issue a ruling on Monday.