Your Honor, I think one of the first things maybe scheduled for today was a hearing with regard to collateral impeachment witnesses of Detective Fuhrman. May we go ahead and handle that one?
Good morning. Your Honor, this is a motion which was brought because of the Defense desire to use additional extrinsive evidence to collaterally impeach Detective Fuhrman's credibility. As the Court is well aware, you have wide discretion in the use of extrinsive evidence for collateral impeachment and in collateral impeachment as a whole, and it is an area of--where many courts do exercise their discretion in precluding substantial evidence of collateral impeachment because it does tend, no matter what the issue and what the trial, to take things off of track in terms of the probative evidence in the case. Now, in this case early on the Court heard the offers of proof from the Defense with regard to a variety of potential witnesses with regard to Detective Mark Fuhrman. And the Court ruled, if I recall, that because Kathleen Bell had indicated that the racial statements she attributes to Detective Fuhrman talked about a black and white couple together and also implied the manufacture of evidence, that the Court felt because--
All right. Exactly. Exactly. And I believe that is what the Court felt was most probative about that particular offer of proof from the Defense, if I am not mistaken, so that is why the Court used its discretion in terms of allowing the Defense to use that collateral impeachment, extrinsive evidence of collateral impeachment. And later after that the Defense came up with Andrea Terry who corroborates in some ways, though she actually--she actually contrasts with Kathleen Bell on an important point, but from the Defense way of thinking apparently she corroborates Kathleen Bell and she as well indicates or alleges that the detective used a racial slur with regard to black and white couples being together. So for the combination reason she indicated black and white couples and she tended to corroborate, in the Defense eyes at least, Kathleen Bell, the Court allowed cross-examination with regard to her statement as well. Now, in this case early on when the Court made those rulings the Defense had impliedly, if not openly, asserted over and over and over that they would be producing evidence that Detective Fuhrman had either the opportunity to plant the Rockingham glove or actual evidence that he did so. And now here we are through the People's case, most of the way, I understand, through the Defense case, and they still have no substantial evidence of any police conspiracy, they have no evidence whatsoever that Mark Fuhrman had any opportunity to plant evidence, had--that he actually did plant any evidence. And I'm sure the Court appreciates the distinction when you look at the Hall type of cases, but I'm not even talking or drawing that analogy today, your Honor, with regard to Hall. I'm asking the Court to look purely at the probative value of extrinsive evidence to impeach Detective Fuhrman, given the lack of any evidence in this case linking him to actually doing anything wrong. That makes the probative value of him being a racist almost nil, because even if the Defense were to successfully convince the Court or anyone else that Detective Fuhrman made these racial slurs and is a racist, that does not prove, that does not show any kind of a link to him actually planting the Rockingham glove. So this wish on the Defense part has just not come true. They have not been able to come up with any evidence that links him to that. Consequently, the evidence showing that he is a racist does nothing in terms of proving their case. On the other hand because of the inflammatory nature of the remarks at issue, especially in front of this predominantly African American jury it does have a substantially undue prejudicial impact on the People. It is something that is abhorrent to hear and the jury is going to be hearing it already in the form of Kathleen Bell and another racist statement in the form of Andrea Terry's testimony. The Court has I believe generally allowed the Defense, and based on good reasons that your Honor indicated, but has generously allowed the Defense use these witnesses. They go to this collateral impeachment issue. That is, when you consider the detective's credibility, it is just not important--as important as it may have once appeared. We have not only the discovery of the glove at Rockingham, but other overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case: The DNA evidence of Bundy, the size and make of the footprints, the shoeprints, rather, left at the Bundy scene, the trace and fiber evidence, the lie to Allan Park that the Defendant said that he was sleeping when Allan Park had just seen him enter the residence. There is a lot of evidence in this case. This case does not hinge for one moment on the credibility of Detective Fuhrman.
But do you think the Defendant owes an explanation to a limousine driver where he has been?
I don't know if he does or not, your Honor, but the point being he didn't have to say anything. If that were the case, if he owed no explanation, he didn't have to say anything. He certainly didn't have to say "I've been sleeping." The point is that he did say that and that it was a lie, so why did he make a point of making a lie to a limousine driver when you are right, he didn't owe him any explanation whatsoever. He simply volunteered that lie, and I would say as an alibi of sorts, though it changed over time and as the trial got going through opening statement and to chipping of golf clubs and so forth. Now, in addition, your Honor, with regard to these recently acquired witnesses from the Defense, this Court has heard numerous motions for months precipitated by the Defense pitchess motion last fall about allegedly racial slurs attributed to Detective Fuhrman. All of that has been broadcast repeatedly to the media. Detective Fuhrman's potential or alleged racial animosity has been an issue before the whole public for many, many months. And in addition, when Mr. Bailey cross-examined Detective Fuhrman, that again brought it to the forefront of this trial, so for the Defense to now have recently acquired witnesses, recently discovered witnesses, renders their credibility highly suspect, these people who apparently have only recently come forward. In addition, to the best of my knowledge, and perhaps we can be enlightened since the discovery on these witnesses is very rough and inadequate to rely on, know what time period they are talking about. It is my understanding from other sources that these witnesses alleged overhear of statement by Detective Fuhrman went back to the mid-1980's possibly `87, `88. Perhaps the Court can ask for a detailed offer of proof in that regard. But the remoteness of those statements, in addition to their being additional witnesses for collateral impeachment on the detective's credibility when his credibility is really not that important now at this stage of the trial, all of that militates in favor of the Court exercising a wide discretion that it has and excluding those witnesses. And your Honor, since I want to save a little bit of time in rebuttal, I think I will submit with that for this part of the argument.
I think much of the argument with respect to this motion really misses the point. The Defense is less interested in proving that Detective Fuhrman is a racist than we are in proving that Detective Fuhrman is a liar. When the glorious moment finally comes when your Honor instructs the jury and sends them out to deliberate, I'm confident that one of the instructions you will give--and the reason I'm confident is because both sides will be requesting this instruction, the Prosecution already has and we certainly will--
The instruction I'm referring to is Caljic 2.21.2, which will tell the jury that: "A witness who was willfully false in one material point of his testimony is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point unless from all of the evidence you believe the probability of truth favors his testimony in other particulars." Now, your Honor can certainly anticipate that we will argue that instruction with respect to the testimony of Detective Fuhrman because in that testimony, no. 1, he flatly denied the Kathleen Bell incident and set up really a test of whether we are going to believe his testimony or believe the testimony of Kathleen Bell. And then he went on in the examination by Mr. Bailey to testify as follows: "And you say under oath that you have not addressed any black person as a Nigger or spoken about black people as Niggers in the past ten years, Detective Fuhrman?
"Fuhrman: That's what I'm saying, sir. "Question: So that anyone who comes to this Court and quotes you as using that word in dealing with African Americans would be a liar, would they not, Detective Fuhrman? "Answer: Yes, they would. "Question: All of them, correct? "Answer: All of them." Now, this testimony, quite simply, dug a hole for the Prosecution, a very deep hole, and over that hole is a headstone that reads "Falsis in unum, familiar in omnibus," and that is precisely what Caljic 2.21.2 is going to tell the jury. Now, we propose to present not only the testimony of Kathleen Bell and Andrea Terry to establish that the conversation alluded to by interracial couples did take place, but we will also present the testimony of Carol Hannack and Natalie Singer. Miss Hannack, the evidence will show, dated Detective Fuhrman's partner, Tom Vettraino in 1987, practically contemporaneous with the Kathleen Bell incidents. She lived in an apartment in west L.A. on several occasions when Mr. Vettraino came to that apartment to pick up Miss Hannack, he was accompanied by Detective Fuhrman. And in conversations that took place at that time Mr. Fuhrman directly used racial epithets including the word "Nigger," and expressed great racial animosity in the presence of Miss Hannack and also in the presence of Miss Hannack's roommate, Natalie Singer, who will testify that she was present on these occasions, that she heard these epithets and that she was offended by them, that finally she refused to let Mr. Fuhrman come into the apartment any more. And finally, we will not be calling Maximo Cordoba at this time but we do propose to call Roderick Hodge, a gentleman who was arrested by Detective Fuhrman on several occasions in the period 1986 to 1987, again contemporaneous with the Kathleen Bell incident. He will testify that his father is African American, his mother was Caucasian, that this fact was apparently known to Detective Fuhrman, that Detective Fuhrman had arrested him on several occasions and on one of these occasions, in January of 1987, after arresting Mr. Hodge for a drug offense, he turned to him in the backseat of a police cruiser and said, "I told you we'd get you, Nigger," and then in a subsequent strip search of Mr. Hodge and several other African Americans, who were arrested with him, he had them bend over in the course of a strip search and said, "You guys look all alike to me." Now, the significance of this evidence is not simply that it shows that Detective Fuhrman is a racist. This evidence shows that Detective Fuhrman is a liar. And the importance of these witnesses is that they all corroborate each other. We haven't heard any concession from the Prosecution that they are ready to concede the credibility of any of these witnesses. I think we can anticipate that these witnesses will be attacked. In fact, they already have. Detective Fuhrman has already called them liars. He has already contested the testimony of Kathleen Bell, so we cannot be deprived now of the opportunity to present evidence to persuade the jury that in fact Detective Fuhrman was lying when he testified and that that lie should lead the jury to distrust all of his testimony. Your Honor of course already ruled on the issue of whether this issue was material and I believe your Honor correctly ruled that the issue of bias is not a collateral issue. The question of whether it is collateral really goes to its cross-examination just as much as the--the use of extrinsive evidence. If the cross-examination of bias--as to bias is proper, then extrinsic evidence is proper when the testimony proves to be false. The only--the only real question being raised about this evidence is the appeal to your Honor's discretion under 352 to exclude it as somehow cumulative, and here I think you have to put this in the context of a seven-month trial, six months of which was devoted to the Prosecution case.
We are now getting to the heart of the Defense case and to exclude this evidence as cumulative would simply be cutting corners by cutting the heart out of the Defense case. There is no question but that the central issue in this trial is the credibility of Detective Fuhrman and that credibility does not come into question just in the context of whether he planted a glove or not. In our original papers we pointed out eleven different aspects of Detective Fuhrman's testimony that we are questioning and that we want the jury to question and that cuts across the entire initial investigation of this case from the discovery of a blood spot on the Bronco to the alleged discovery of the glove and the circumstances of the discovery of that glove. There are many aspects of his testimony that are of crucial significance to this case so that the credibility of this detective is unquestionably a central issue in this case. We are less interested, I again say, in proving that he is a racist, as we are in proving that he is a liar, and these five witnesses corroborating each other, we believe will establish at least a reasonable doubt in the mind of this jury as to whether any of the testimony presented by Detective Fuhrman should be believed.
Mr. Uelmen, specifically the offer of proof by the Defense with regards to these witnesses, these three additional witnesses, is pretty sketchy at this point. I mean, you have said in generality, but specifically what is it that they are going to say?
Well, if your Honor wants a more detailed outline of the--of the offer of proof, we can certainly provide that, but essentially what they are going to say is that at approximately the same time that the Kathleen Bell--
I don't want approximately. I want specifically what do they say that Detective Fuhrman said?
That he frequently referred to black people as Niggers, that he expressed great racial animosity toward black people, and you know, I can--if you want, we can offer quotations, but at this point that is all I'm prepared to indicate. There is no question but that these witnesses will contradict his testimony that he did not use that racial epithet in the past ten years and that testimony was quite calculated. Detective Fuhrman attempted to present himself to this jury as a choirboy and he knew what he was doing. He knew what he was saying when he said this and he set it up. I mean, he dug the hole, so there is no question but that these witnesses will directly contradict that testimony and show that Detective Fuhrman's testimony in that material respect was false and on that basis the jury can reject his entire testimony.
Yes. Mr. Uelmen has just confirmed what I indicated to the Court and that is that these witness' testimony relates to remote in time incidents, if there is any truth to the incident whatsoever. He indicated Carol Hannack in 1987. I did not hear an offer of proof with regard to Natalie Singer. Maybe I just didn't hear it, but I believe that she is also the same time as Carol Hannack in 1987 because my information is that she was Carol Hannack's roommate and may have been present on one or more occasions. So that they are remote in time and that certainly decreases their probative value. And the fact that Mr. Uelmen is unable to say with any greater specificity what those witness would say is also demonstrative of how little their offer of proof amounts to with regard to those witnesses. In addition, I want to remind the Court that I did submit in camera ex parte under 1054.7 of the penal code some information with regard to Roderick Hodge. Defense counsel has indicated to the arrest they are talking about was in January of 1987 and I would ask the Court to consider that information which is impeachment and not discoverable to the Defense in conjunction with the probative value of Mr. Hodge's testimony because it seems to demonstrate that he is clearly not telling the truth in terms of the offer of proof given the Defense. Mr. Uelmen points to the jury instruction that talks about where a witness is false in a material part of his testimony and with all due respect to people of color everywhere, I submit that whether or not he used the "N" word at some point in the remote past is not a material part of his testimony. Whether he discovered the glove at Rockingham is material. Whether he saw blood inside the Bronco is material. But on this collateral impeachment issue that is not what the law considers material testimony. It doesn't surprise me, your Honor, that the Defense is electing to not call Maximo Cordoba considering the--his own self-impeaching testimony to having talked about remembering these so-called statements that he remembered having dreamt about them the night before. At any rate, your Honor, I do go back to my initial point and that is that the Court has allowed--and we are not asking the Court to reconsider. We are not coming back here whining about Kathleen Bell or Andrea Terry. The Court has already allowed and ruled that they may testify and they are witnesses that do go to extrinsive collateral impeachment, extrinsive evidence of collateral impeachment of Detective Fuhrman. That is more, I believe, with all respect, your Honor, that the Defense should be allowed to do in this case. The Court has generally allowed them to do that and that is more than enough. We don't need to get sidetracked into a miniature sideshow and miniature trial on the credibility of Detective Fuhrman in terms of whether or not he ever used the "N" word. That is prejudicial, it is inflammatory and it is unduly prejudicial to the Prosecution's--excuse me--Prosecution's case, so I think the develops should be precluded. I would ask the Court, and that is what the motion is, for the Court to preclude these additional--parade of additional witnesses to go to this one limited narrow issue for which they already have two witnesses to testify.
All right. Thank you, counsel. Counsel, I think that the presentation of this particular issue at this particular time is premature for this reason: The Court had ruled that the testimony from Kathleen Bell and from Andrea Terry was admissible both for the purpose of demonstrating racial animus and the proclivity to combine that characteristic with the willingness to manufacture probable cause. I found that specifically relevant to the facts and circumstances of this case. After I see how that evidence is presented, and if there is any need for any additional information on that particular issue, then I will reconsider it. At this time, however, I think the presentation in the offer of proof is premature. It does strike me immediately as being cumulative, but I think I can only make that determination after I have seen Kathleen Bell and Andrea Terry testify.
So I will take this matter under submission until I hear the testimony of those two witnesses. And I take it that Mr. Cordoba is off the witness list at this time?
He is not on our short list. We have not given his name, your Honor, and I don't intend at this point to call him.
The Defense is less interested in proving that Detective Fuhrman is a racist than we are in proving that Detective Fuhrman is a liar.
So that anyone who comes to this Court and quotes you as using that word in dealing with African Americans would be a liar, would they not, Detective Fuhrman? Answer: Yes, they would. Question: All of them, correct? Answer: All of them.
And over that hole is a headstone that reads 'Falsis in unum, familiar in omnibus,' and that is precisely what Caljic 2.21.2 is going to tell the jury.
This case does not hinge for one moment on the credibility of Detective Fuhrman.
I just smile as your thought that that might be a glorious moment.