📄 Motion: evidence of procedure — Tuesday, January 21, 1997
Address:
C:\DEPT103\CIVIL\1997\JAN\21\MOTION-EVIDENCE-OF-PROCEDURE.DOC
TRIAL
▲ Day 45 of 57

Motion: evidence of procedure

Date: Tuesday, January 21, 1997 • Utterances: 58
The court heard oral argument on whether jury instructions regarding evidentiary presumptions (that police followed proper procedures) should be given. Judge Fujisaki ultimately excluded all presumption instructions, ruling that the plaintiffs' own earlier motion had precluded the defense from establishing the standards against which those presumptions would be measured. The hearing then shifted to disputes over the damages instruction (BAJI 14.50), a jury instruction about the custody proceeding in Orange County, an instruction about Exhibit 732, and the verdict form.
1 THE COURT:

Excuse me.

2 MR. GELBLUM:

I'm responding.

3 THE COURT:

I want you to respond to my question. My question is what is your response to Mr. Leonard's last argument.

4 MR. GELBLUM:

Well, I believe his last argument was they weren't allowed to put on evidence of what the procedure is.

5 THE COURT:

What the standards were that in the beneficiaries of the presumptions are seeking to -- or should have followed.

6 MR. GELBLUM:

My reference to the Mazzola video is part of the response.

7 THE COURT:

That's not very responsive.

8 MR. GELBLUM:

Okay.

Well, the only procedure -- standard we're talking about, and procedures that we're talking about, in the instructions we've requested, is a very broad standard which is thou shalt not plant plaintiffs' evidence.

I don't know how anybody can argue that's not part of standard procedures for the police department. They're not supposed to plant or manufacture evidence. Okay. Same thing with collecting the evidence. They're supposed to collect it properly. Same thing with tests, they're supposed to conduct the tests properly.

I don't recall the defense coming in with any attempt to talk, in fact, on the testing, Your Honor, they answered the request for admissions, they admitted the tests were done properly. They absolutely admitted those tests were done properly. They said there was some problem with the blood before and this they admit the tests were done properly.

A lot of this evidence came in and was allowed to come in.

KEY QUOTE
9 MR. LEONARD:

Your Honor, I'd like to respond to the final point. That's absolutely not what we did in response to request for admission.

Also, one final point. There's another reason why this instruction shouldn't be given, and that is that they're getting the benefit of both the presumption and putting on a witness.

There's a case analogous called Coe versus Southern Pacific Company, an old railroad case from 1962. It involves due care by the railroad.

I'll give you the citation. It's 203 CalAp. 2, 509, 1962.

It's precisely the same issue except it involved the presumption of due care by a railroad. The Court says in the end -- it's a similar situation. They put the engineer on to say that he was exercising due care at the same time they wanted the presumption. And the Court says you can't get both, you've got to choose.

And that's what you should do in this case, Your Honor. They can't have both. They can't. And they also can't have the benefit of their restrictive view of the case, and their objections which were sustained by you, and at the same time get the presumption. It's just not fair.

10 MR. GELBLUM:

Your Honor, number one, obviously we had to put on evidence. We didn't know -- we still don't know whether this instruction is going to be given. We had to put on evidence. It's ludicrous to say we can't have the presumption because we put on evidence.

Secondly, I think that Mr. Leonard greatly overstates the restrictions that they were under. There were many, many cross-examinations, questions by the defense, regarding proper procedures and filling out the sheets for Andrea Mazzola. If they were allowed to then -- if they fill out their sheets, a lot of that wasn't allowed, you put limited restrictions. There wasn't any lengthy questioning whether they went in properly. There were a lot of questions about whether they did something properly. Properly means based against some standard or procedure.

11 MR. LEONARD:

Your Honor, if that's the case, I can't imagine in any of these instances when we were somehow allowed to get in the standards which were never articulated. If the witnesses admitted they didn't follow the standards, then we obviously have proven that they didn't follow the standards in any respect and then there's no need to give the presumption now. End of matter.

12 THE COURT:

Okay. Submitted.

13 MR. LEONARD:

Thank you.

14 MR. GELBLUM:

One last thing.

15 THE COURT:

Go ahead.

16 MR. GELBLUM:

If as a -- as a backup, I guess, if you're inclined to accept Mr. Leonard's position on his last point, that can be solved by adding a paragraph to the instruction regarding if performed by a preponderance of the evidence, that standards were not complied with. That would handle that issue.

17 THE COURT:

Well, based upon the Court's earlier ruling, which is actually based upon a motion of plaintiff, I think the Court did preclude the defendant from establishing standards on which the presumption can be measured, as referred to in the Davenport case, the Court is going to exclude all the instructions as to presumptions.

There was one additional 14.50 that I have in this group that I have marked as objected.

Did we continue the issue of measure of damages last Friday?

KEY QUOTE
18 MR. GELBLUM:

Yeah. We agreed finally after some discussion that we would go with 14.50 putting in the names of the parties. That's what we submitted.

19 THE COURT:

So the batch that we gave you to work on over the weekend, that's the 14.50 that you were offering?

20 MR. GELBLUM:

No. We had -- we had combined 14.50 and 14.52.

21 THE COURT:

That's what you're offering?

22 MR. GELBLUM:

No. We're just offering straight 14.50. It says -- it has the number at the top. See where it says 14.50 and 14.52, that really should say just straight 14.50 with names put in as Your Honor said we could, rather than saying deceased and heirs.

23 MR. BAKER:

Well, you know --

24 THE COURT:

Okay.

25 MR. BAKER:

They don't need the one on Rufo because Rufo is included in the redundant. At least in the packet that they have favored me with, they have.

26 MR. GELBLUM:

There's two separate plaintiffs there to give an aggregate. I assume they can consider them separately and add them up together.

27 MR. BAKER:

No, but look at your instruction. You have two plaintiffs.

28 MR. GELBLUM:

Right.

29 MR. BAKER:

And then you go on the next one and then have --

30 THE COURT:

Okay. That's satisfactory.

31 MR. BAKER:

And, Your Honor, I object to the verdict form in its present form.

32 MR. GELBLUM:

Before --

33 THE COURT:

Let me finish with the instructions.

34 MR. BAKER:

Okay. I apologize. I thought you said you were satisfied, meaning the instructions.

35 THE COURT:

No, the 14.50.

36 MR. BAKER:

Okay.

37 THE COURT:

With regards to the instruction, with regards to the proceeding in another county. It's been tagged, the clerk informs me that you have an objection to that one.

38 MR. BAKER:

Yes, Your Honor.

39 MR. GELBLUM:

If I may explain, because I submitted it, just what it is.

40 THE COURT:

Go ahead.

41 MR. GELBLUM:

It tracks almost verbatim the instruction that you gave the jury when we left on vacation, except with -- I added the end, the judge in that proceeding did not consider any evidence regarding the deaths of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, which I think is taken almost verbatim from the opinion of the custody judge.

42 THE COURT:

Okay. I'll give that.

43 MR. BAKER:

Your Honor, may I be heard? Let me put on the record my objection to it.

44 THE COURT:

Yes.

45 MR. BAKER:

This instruction, as stated, is not true, that the issues and the ruling of the proceeding have nothing to do with this case.

Six witnesses testified, and they previewed those witnesses at the custody hearing and brought them into this case.

And indeed, the circumstantial evidence regarding the deaths of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman were an issue and raised by the -- the Browns in Orange County, No. 3, and the whole issue down there was the relationship, but Alan Aguilar, Day OJ Simpson, Judy Brown, all testified in that case.

So this is an inaccurate statement of what occurred down there.

I don't think we ought to highlight that proceeding.

46 THE COURT:

That's the point of the instruction, so that I'll highlight it.

I will give it.

KEY QUOTE
47 MR. GELBLUM:

A new instruction, Your Honor, was one requested about Exhibit 732.

48 THE COURT:

Yes.

49 MR. GELBLUM:

That's in there. I don't know if there's any objection to that.

50 MR. BAKER:

Yes. I object to that. I object to highlighting that. You've given them an instruction that I objected to at the time, and I object to this.

51 THE COURT:

Okay. Admonished them at the time and now they're getting an instruction.

52 MR. BAKER:

I think you gave them an instruction before and you're giving them a second instruction.

53 THE COURT:

Well, I'll stand on the record.

54 THE COURT:

Okay. State your objection to the verdict form.

55 MR. BAKER:

Yes, Your Honor.

My objections to the verdict form are, No. 1, it doesn't give adequate instructions to the jury as to what they're to do relative to answering questions. It isn't in the proper order, in terms of the questions, and I will propose an alternative verdict form.

For example, it reads -- question 1 is "Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant Simpson willfully and wrongfully caused the death of Ronald Goldman?

Then it asks to award damages.

Then it goes to the issue of battery. It doesn't suggest any damages at all, and it doesn't tell them -- for example, at the end of question 1 it says, if your answer is no, do not answer question 2.

It doesn't tell them where to proceed to answer the questions, never gives them instructions when they're to sign and return the verdict form.

And the questions relative to damages, that should be at the conclusion like it is in every other verdict form.

And the issue relative to the battery of Nicole Brown Simpson should be question 3 rather than 6.

I will propose a new jury verdict form tomorrow.

56 MR. BREWER:

Your Honor, Mr. Baker and I discussed early this morning the verdict form, and rather than have both sides, why don't we muddle through this form.

I think we can -- we started to do so earlier, and we'll see if we can decide upon a special verdict form. Have that to you sometime today. Agreed?

57 MR. BAKER:

Well, I don't know if we're going to have it today.

58 MR. BREWER:

We'll work on it today.

Temperature

tense

Key Quotes (5)

Gelblum
the only procedure -- standard we're talking about, and procedures that we're talking about, in the instructions we've requested, is a very broad standard which is thou shalt not plant plaintiffs' evidence.
Gelblum characterizes the evidentiary standard at stake as a basic anti-tampering rule, trying to minimize the defense's objection that the standard was never properly established.
Leonard
They can't have both. They can't. And they also can't have the benefit of their restrictive view of the case, and their objections which were sustained by you, and at the same time get the presumption. It's just not fair.
Core defense argument: plaintiffs blocked the defense from attacking procedural standards, then sought to benefit from a presumption that those standards were followed — Leonard argues this is fundamentally inequitable.
Fujisaki
based upon the Court's earlier ruling, which is actually based upon a motion of plaintiff, I think the Court did preclude the defendant from establishing standards on which the presumption can be measured... the Court is going to exclude all the instructions as to presumptions.
The dispositive ruling: the presumption instructions are excluded entirely, a significant win for the defense on this issue.
Baker
Six witnesses testified, and they previewed those witnesses at the custody hearing and brought them into this case. And indeed, the circumstantial evidence regarding the deaths of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman were an issue and raised by the -- the Browns in Orange County.
Baker challenges the accuracy of a proposed instruction telling the jury that the Orange County custody proceeding did not consider evidence regarding the deaths — he argues it did.
Fujisaki
That's the point of the instruction, so that I'll highlight it. I will give it.
Fujisaki overrules Baker's objection and gives the custody proceeding instruction anyway, signaling he wants the jury focused on the limited relevance of that proceeding.

Evidence (2)

Exhibit 732
Unspecified exhibit about which the court previously admonished the jury; a new jury instruction was proposed to accompany it
discussed; instruction approved over Baker's objection
Informal
Andrea Mazzola evidence collection video (Mazzola video) and evidence collection sheets
discussed as context for the presumption argument

Notable Exchanges (4)

FujisakiGelblum
Fujisaki repeatedly cuts off Gelblum for not answering his direct question about Leonard's last argument; Gelblum deflects to the Mazzola video before the judge calls it 'not very responsive.'
tense
LeonardGelblum
Leonard invokes an analogous 1962 railroad case (Coe v. Southern Pacific, 203 Cal.App.2d 509) to argue the plaintiffs cannot simultaneously put on witnesses and claim a procedural presumption; Gelblum counters that they had no choice but to put on evidence since the instruction might not be given.
strategic
BakerFujisaki
Baker objects to the proposed instruction about the Orange County custody proceeding as factually inaccurate, arguing that six witnesses from that proceeding testified in the civil trial and that the deaths were raised as an issue there. Fujisaki acknowledges the point and gives the instruction anyway.
heated
BakerBrewer
Baker raises multiple structural objections to the verdict form (question ordering, missing damage guidance, no instructions on when to sign and return); Brewer proposes they work together to produce an agreed-upon special verdict form rather than submit competing versions.
procedural

Credibility Attacks (1)

⚔ LAPD evidence collectors (Andrea Mazzola et al.)
procedural non-compliance argument
Leonard argues the defense was improperly prevented from establishing the specific standards against which the collectors' conduct should be measured, and that the request for admissions record was mischaracterized by Gelblum — the defense did NOT admit the tests were done properly.

Objections

6 objections (0 sustained, 3 overruled)
Proceeding 8844 • 58 utterances
Civil Trial
Department 103
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📂 JAN 21, 1997 📄 Motion: evidence of procedure
JAN 21, 1997 KRT DvH TD