Yesterday Mr. Gelblum mentioned to the Court that in -- In dissolutions, future value of value of future earnings is considered goodwill. He made that representation on the record. That's absolutely contrary to the law, as our research indicated. And the cases on those Witkins on community property section 71 in re the marriage of Fortier F-O-R-T-I-E-R, 34 Cal.Ap.3d, 384 at 388, in re the marriage of Foster 42 Cal.Ap.3d 577, 584, in re the marriage of Almov (phonetic), in re the marriage of Slater, in re the marriage of Reeves, in re the marriage of King. All of those cases hold that future earnings cannot be included in any claim for goodwill. So we would renew our motion that the purported future earnings of Mr. Simpson, which we suspect is speculative, should not be an item that is introduced to this jury.
Obviously, I haven't seen the cases. We're not arguing the future earnings themselves. It's goodwill measured by the risks and opportunities to obtain future earnings. As Your Honor noted yesterday, it's a well established concept in the law, goodwill. It's usually done in corporate cases, but there are celebrity goodwill cases as well that I cited to the court yesterday, and it's a readily acknowledged and accepted element of net worth. We'll have testimony on that subject.
It's not readily acknowledged or accepted. There's not a single California case that allows them to do what they're purporting to do here today.
All right. I stand on my ruling. Okay. We have jury instructions. The defendant submitted four separate instructions based upon Adams versus Muricomi 54 Cal.Ap 3d, 105. The Court looked at the instructions and also reread the Adams case. The language that the defendant seeks to have the Court instruct the jury on, it appears to me that the language is intended by the Supreme Court to describe the function of the reviewing court in terms of how they would view the damages that were awarded to ascertain whether or not it exceeded or failed to meet the various requirements and prongs that the appellate court uses to ascertain whether or not the damages were excessive. They don't speak of these criteria as criteria that the jury must weigh the evidence against, but it is rather an appellate court's function to ascertain whether the amount arrived at by the jury fits or doesn't fit that criteria. The jury instruction, on that basis, I think, is one that ought not to be given to the jury and the court will not give it. The plaintiffs' requested instructions are simply BAJI 50.55 and 14.72.2. That is the criteria that the appellate courts have held sufficient for the jury, so the Court will give that.
If you read what they said in there, paragraph 3, they're talking about injury, harm or damage actually suffered by Ron. That is not the law. It's the actual damage suffered by plaintiffs.
Can you bring me the other volume that I have on my desk. (Clerk complies.) (Court reviews book.)
In Neal versus Farmers's Insurance Exchange 21 Cal 3d, 910, which is extensively quoted in Adams versus Muricomi at 929, the Supreme Court is talking about the proportionality of the damages to the damages suffered. And in this instance, the damaged party, the plaintiff, was suing the insurance company on the death of Mrs. Neal, and stated, quote, "Although the amount of compensatory damages legally recoverable was limited to a relatively modest amount, (no more than $10,000), by the fortuitous occurrence of Mrs. Neal's death prior to trial, we believe that absent this limitation, plaintiff would have recovered a substantial amount of compensation for emotional distress suffered by Mrs. Neal as a consequence of the insurer's breach of duty in these circumstances which we cannot allow the apparent disproportion between the recoverable compensatory damages and the total award as reduced to lead us to nullify the award." So it appears to me that the appellate court is looking toward the jury in determining the reasonable relationship of the punitive damages to the injured. So I think paragraph 3 is still the law. If that is an objection, the objection is overruled. Okay. Bring the jury in, please.
There's not a single California case that allows them to do what they're purporting to do here today.
The language that the defendant seeks to have the Court instruct the jury on, it appears to me that the language is intended by the Supreme Court to describe the function of the reviewing court in terms of how they would view the damages... They don't speak of these criteria as criteria that the jury must weigh the evidence against.
They're talking about injury, harm or damage actually suffered by Ron. That is not the law. It's the actual damage suffered by plaintiffs.
This is a survival action.