📄 Direct examination of Dr. Park Dietz — Thursday, November 7, 1996
Address:
C:\DEPT103\CIVIL\1996\NOV\7\DIRECT-EXAMINATION-OF-DR-PARK-.DOC
TRIAL
▲ Day 11 of 57

Direct examination of Dr. Park Dietz

Witness: Dr. Park Dietz
Examiner: Peter Gelblum
Called by: Plaintiff • Date: Thursday, November 7, 1996 • Utterances: 318
This is a 402 (Kelly-Frye admissibility) hearing in which plaintiffs' expert Dr. Park Dietz, a forensic psychiatrist, testified about his qualifications and methodology for rendering opinions on Simpson's motive. Defense attorney Leonard challenged whether Dietz's crime-scene profiling methodology was scientifically testable and appropriate for a jury, and used Dietz's deposition to probe the limits and contradictions of his intended opinions.
1 MR. GELBLUM:

We call Dr. Park Dietz.

2 THE CLERK:

Sir, if you would, step up behind the court reporter.

Please raise your right hand to be sworn.

PARK DIETZ was called as a witness on behalf of the Plaintiffs, was duly sworn, and testified as follows:

3 THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you may give in the cause now pending before this court shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

4 DR. PARK DIETZ:

I do.

5 THE CLERK:

Please be seated.

6 MR. GELBLUM:

Afternoon, Doctor.

7 THE CLERK:

Doctor, would you state and spell your name for the record.

8 DR. PARK DIETZ:

My first name is Park, P-A-R-K, middle name Elliott, E-L-L-I-O-T-T, surname Dietz, D-I-E-T-Z.

9 MR. GELBLUM:

Hello again.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. GELBLUM:

10 Q:

Dr. Dietz, what is your current occupation?

11 A:

I'm a physician, specializing in psychiatry; and for some years, my practice has been limited to the subspecialty of forensic psychiatry.

12 Q:

Okay.

Can you briefly tell the Court what your education is, your higher education?

13 A:

I received my bachelor's degree in psychology and biology from Cornell University in .

I received my medical degree and M.D. from Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine in .

In the same year, I received a master's degree in public health, also from Johns Hopkins.

And upon completing a dissertation some years later, in 1984, I received a Ph.D. in psychology, also from Johns Hopkins.

14 Q:

And have you had any training in the area of forensic psychiatry, Doctor?

15 A:

Yes, I did.

Originally, as part of my residency training in psychiatry, I spent two years as an assistant resident in psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, and then spent my third year of residency as the chief fellow in forensic psychiatry and resident in psychiatry at the hospital of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.

16 MR. LEONARD:

Your Honor, stipulate as to his qualifications as a forensic psychiatrist.

17 MR. GELBLUM:

I'd like to go through a little bit more, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT:

Go ahead.

19 Q:

(BY MR. GELBLUM) Dr. Dietz, can you tell us some of the positions you've held that are particularly applicable to the testimony here?

20 A:

I spent four years as assistant professor of psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School.

And my first assignment was as the director of forensic psychiatry for the hospital for the criminally insane, where I was responsible for the pretrial evaluations of the more serious criminal defendants thought to have mental disorders, for the trial courts of Massachusetts.

Then I spent my third year at Harvard evaluating John Hinkley on behalf of the U.S. Attorney's office in connection with charges arising from the attempted assassination of President Reagan.

Then I spent a year studying mentally disordered offenders.

My next position was at the University of Virginia, where I was originally an associate professor, and later professor of law and professor of behavioral medicine in psychiatry.

And I was medical director of the Institute of Law Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. I taught half-time at a law school, teaching courses in law and psychiatry, criminal behavior, crimes of violence, and related fields; and half of my time, I spent directing the fellowship training program in forensic psychiatry and bringing the forensic psychiatry clinic to the university.

During those years, I also began an active association -- or actually, rather, continued an association with the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. That had begun in the late 1970s and was formalized in 1981.

And I have, for the years since then, been the psychiatrist for the unit that's gone under a variety of names. Today it's called the profiling unit. It had been the behavioral sciences unit. It is part of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime.

And in 1988, I moved to southern California.

Today, I am clinical professor of psychiatry and biobehavioral sciences at U.C.L.A. And I divide my time between a forensic psychiatry practice which occupies half my time, which is actually a group of -- a number of consultants and another activity, which is called threat assessment group. And that's a firm which provides consultation to employers for the prevention of workplace violence.

We also do some work for governmental agencies. It's preventative work for preventing people from getting hurt.

21 Q:

Did you bring a copy of your curriculum vitae with you?

22 A:

Yes.

23 MR. GELBLUM:

Your Honor, I submit that to the Court for his review and shortcut the recitation.

24 THE COURT:

I thought he gave it.

25 MR. GELBLUM:

It's just the first couple pages.

26 MR. LEONARD:

No. A lot more.

27 MR. GELBLUM:

Would you like to mark it as an exhibit?

28 THE COURT:

Whatever way you want to do it.

29 MR. GELBLUM:

Shall we?

30 THE COURT:

It's your witness.

31 MR. GELBLUM:

Next in order?

32 THE CLERK:

No; this is plaintiff. Can we mark it Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 for this hearing.

33 (The instrument herein referred to as Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Park Dietz was marked for identification as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 to this 402 hearing.)
34 Q:

(BY MR. GELBLUM) Dr. Dietz, let me show you, so we can get this authenticated, what we can mark as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 for this hearing.

Is that a copy of your curriculum vitae?

35 A:

Yes, it is.

36 Q:

And is this up to date?

37 A:

It's up to date as of the date on it, which is October of 1995. So actually, it's a year old now.

38 Q:

And does it contain your major publications and research and editorial boards you've sat on?

39 A:

Yes.

40 Q:

Doctor, do you have experience in the field of a crime-scene analysis?

41 A:

Yes, I do.

42 Q:

And tell us a little bit about what that field is, crime-scene analysis.

43 A:

Well, crime-scene analysis, of course, is the effort to learn information from the study of a crime scene.

And because that's the nature of what the field is; it's an activity primarily of criminal investigators. It's in the routine order of business for homicide detectives, and has also been, for many years, indeed, centuries, some physicians, coroners, who include nonphysicians, have always been involved in crime-scene analysis; and forensic pathologists have more systematically developed the medical aspects of crime-scene investigation over the decades.

Forensic psychiatry is rather a latecomer to the systematic analysis of crime scenes. But that activity of learning from a crime scene what it has to tell is not specific to medicine or to law enforcement, but rather, bridges both, and indeed, other fields. There are other analysts who go to crime scenes and seek to learn from them.

44 Q:

Okay. And tell us a little bit about your experience in crime-scene analysis.

45 A:

My experience actually began while I was still a medical student. I had a laboratory at the medical examiner's office in Baltimore and began to go out to crime scenes with the investigators for the ME's office.

I continued to work with medical examiner's office in Philadelphia, when I moved there.

And so I had already been interested in how much one could learn from crime scenes and from autopsies, about the manner of an offense and about the behavior of the offender, even before I was formally in forensic psychiatry.

46 Q:

Did you have any experience with crime-scene analysis at the FBI Academy?

47 A:

Yes, beginning in 1979.

48 Q:

How long?

49 A:

I was done with my training.

50 Q:

I'm sorry; how long were you there at the FBI Academy?

51 A:

I've gone intermittently ever since 1979.

52 Q:

And have you had experience with crime-scene analysis with other law enforcement agencies?

53 A:

Yes. I'm the forensic psychiatrist for the New York State Police, and I have regular involvement both through the FBI and New York State Police.

Many other agencies, possibly scores, have, over the years, consulted me on one case at a time, though I have no ongoing relationship with them.

54 Q:

In your current work as the president of the Threat Assessment Group, do you get involved in crime-scene analysis?

55 A:

We get involved in the analysis of many unsolved crimes; they don't always involve what ought to be regarded as a scene, but where there is a crime scene to evaluate. We're involved in that.

56 Q:

Are you familiar with the concept of indirect behavioral assessment?

57 A:

Yes.

58 Q:

What is that concept?

59 A:

That's actually a concept I introduced in the mid-eighties to encompass a range of activities that people in my field of forensic psychiatry and related fields were often involved in.

It was meant to encompass the activity of psychological autopsies. That was -- had been ongoing since the 1960s, in fact, starting in the LA Coroner's Office, where much of the original work was done on the concept of psychiatric autopsies. It encompassed the efforts that physicians were making to evaluate the mental state of testators who were already dead and no longer available to examine.

It encompassed the work that was then called "profiling" being done by the FBI, which was the effort to analyze a crime scene or series of crimes, to be able to narrow the scope of the investigation toward a smaller group of suspects. The term was also meant to encompass the analysis of threatening communications or anonymous letters, bomb threats, death threats, et cetera, where one was trying to infer about human behavior from evidence of a kind that didn't include a face-to-face interview with the person whose behavior was being evaluated.

And there are other examples, as well, of the activities that forensic psychiatrists and law enforcement officers engage in, where we have to try to reason from data, other than interview, data about human behavior.

60 Q:

Is that something that forensic psychiatrists do routinely?

61 A:

It is, as a matter of fact.

Unlike clinical psychiatry and forensic psychiatry, it's been long recognized that because people who are parties to a matter are not always truthful, the indirect evidence about behavior is often more reliable than the direct evidence that might come from an interview. So whereas in clinical psychiatry, doctors obviously rely greatly on what their patients tell them. In forensic psychiatry, we have to rely on more than direct sources of information.

62 Q:

Now, in this case, Dr. Dietz, are you prepared to render an opinion regarding a likely motive that Mr. Simpson had for committing the two murders at issue here?

63 A:

Yes.

64 Q:

And is that opinion based on any technique, process or theory that is new to science?

65 MR. LEONARD:

Objection. Leading.

66 THE COURT:

This being a 402 hearing, overruled.

67 DR. PARK DIETZ:

Well, as a predicate to my -- and I want it to be clear that your answer assumes that Mr. Simpson is indeed the killer.

And given that assumption, I'm prepared to offer an opinion as to motivation.

And that opinion would be based on a kind of analysis that is not new and that is not one that I would characterize as a scientific technique.

68 Q:

Can you describe the process for us?

69 A:

Yes.

The process is a rather straightforward one of first looking at the crime scene through photographs and diagrams, looking at the injuries to the victims as portrayed in autopsy photographs, and then the protocol from each autopsy.

And based on the information that comes from the scene and from the autopsies, looking at the behavior that was necessary in order for that scene to have resulted and for those injuries to have resulted, and then reasoning about that scene and those injuries to examine what inferences, if any, can be drawn behaviorally about the offender.

70 Q:

Does that person you're talking about now assume that Mr. Simpson is the perpetrator, or is that simply trying to figure out whoever did it, what's the motivation for this particular crime?

71 MR. LEONARD:

Vague. I didn't understand it.

72 THE COURT:

Overruled.

73 MR. LEONARD:

It's up to you if you understand it.

74 THE COURT:

Overruled.

75 DR. PARK DIETZ:

What I said in my last answer is not based on any assumption of who did it; but rather, my first approach to look at motive is to look at the crime scene and the autopsy information.

76 Q:

And that's regardless of who you think may or may not have done it, has nothing to do with Mr. Simpson?

77 A:

That's correct. That is one source of information as to motive. If one of them then changes ground and says, assuming that Mr. Simpson is the killer, what is the motive, that brings into play other data that are specific to Mr. Simpson and to Ms. Simpson and to Mr. Goldman and to the relationships.

And so with that other information, then it becomes possible to, of course, be much more specific.

78 Q:

Okay. Let's start just with the first one you described, which is the analysis.

As I understand what you're saying, it's based solely on the photographs that you've seen of the crime scene and the autopsies and the autopsy protocols; is that right?

79 A:

Yes.

80 Q:

Okay. Now, when you're analyzing those, are you applying what you would call any kind of scientific technique or method?

81 A:

No.

82 Q:

Are the materials that you just described that you relied on in forming your opinion, materials that are typically relied upon by other experts in this field?

83 A:

Yes. And in any homicide case, a forensic psychiatrist ought to be concerned with the crime scene and with the autopsies or autopsy of the victim. And that kind of information is routinely relied on by those who pay attention to the data as they should.

84 Q:

What kind of people, in your experience, engage in that kind of analysis; what kinds of occupations?

85 A:

Well, for crime-scene analysis and looking at all autopsies to learn about the behavior, that's possibly done most often by homicide detectives who, at every homicide scene, are trying to do precisely that, and who attend autopsies largely for that purpose.

It's also done by medical examiners and the other investigators who work at medical examiners' offices, other people in the forensic sciences, including, of course, forensic psychiatry.

86 Q:

Is there published literature in this field?

87 A:

Yes, there is.

88 Q:

Can you cite any examples of it?

89 A:

Certainly.

All textbooks of homicide investigation talk about crime-scene analysis. And that's been true for more than a century.

Probably the earliest psychiatric writings just talk specifically about crime scenes, which would be the writings of Richard von Krafft-Ebing, who, unlike other forensic psychiatrists of his day, a century ago, had developed a close friendship with the preeminent professor of criminology at the time, Hans Gross, who was a student of crime scenes and wrote the most important textbook of criminal investigation.

In fact, it's still in print today.

90 Q:

When was that first published?

91 A:

Sometime prior to 1875.

92 Q:

Okay. And that's essentially the same kind of crime-scene analysis that we're talking about in this case?

93 A:

Well, it starts from the same place. Now, over the years, we have learned something -- or at least we all like to think so -- that the techniques have been that -- that existed then have become enhanced somewhat by further information that's developed over the years, and it continues to evolve.

The first writing specifically about making behavioral inferences from crime scenes might be a book by James Brussel, published in 1968, called Case_Book_of_a_Crime_Psychiatrist.

And Dr. Brussel had been involved in solving the case known as "The Mad Bomber," involving George Matesti and that by looking at indirect evidence that helped him point toward a particular suspect.

94 Q:

Can you cite any additional publications in the area of forensic psychiatry relating to crime-scene analysis?

95 A:

Yes. Well --

96 Q:

Do you have a list of them?

97 A:

In my head, not in my hand.

98 Q:

Just give us, perhaps, the leading few.

99 A:

Probably the best known work today would be the FBI_Crime_Classification_Manual, which is not a

forensic psychiatry work, but a law enforcement work.

100 Q:

Okay. Any others of particular note?

101 A:

I wouldn't want to characterize them as leading, but I should mention two of my own.

102 Q:

Okay.

103 (Laughter.)
104 DR. PARK DIETZ:

I published an article called Sex Offender_Profiling_by_the_FBI.

105 Q:

Where did you publish that?

106 A:

It was originally in a Justice Department publication called Proceedings_of_a_Forensic_Science_ Symposium_on_the_Analysis_of_Sexual_Assault_Evidence. And it was reprinted in Clinical_Chronicles, which was published by the University of Toronto.

107 Q:

And what was the other article you were going to mention?

108 A:

Another one of mine that I think is on point is entitled Sexual_Fatalities_Behavioral_ Reconstruction_and_Equivocal_Cases.

109 Q:

Where was that published?

110 A:

Originally, in the Journal_of_Forensic_ Sciences.

111 Q:

Doctor, have you ever qualified to testify as an expert in court on a similar opinion; that is, testifying as to motive, based on an analysis of the crime scene and autopsy?

112 A:

Yes.

113 Q:

Can you cite to us some cases?

114 A:

Of course. That comes up as part of nearly every homicide case that I testify in.

So, backwards, from most recent homicide cases where we've talked about the crime scene and motive, would include California_versus_Ernesto_ Anguiano, where I testified in October of '96.

One was Wisconsin versus -- sorry; that one's not a homicide.

California_versus_Sally_McNeil, where I testified at trial in March of '96.

California_versus_Erik_Menendez, where I testified in February of '96.

California_versus_Richard_Davis, which is the Polly Klaas case. I testified at trial in May of '96.

115 Q:

Did you justify arriving -- determining -- trying to determine motive from an analysis of the crime scene in the Klaas case?

116 A:

Yes. In fact, that was the principal purpose of my participation in the case.

United_States_versus_James_E._Swann,_Jr., where I testified at trial in September '94.

117 Q:

Please tell us how many others there are in the last, say, five years.

118 A:

Nine others from that point back to the mid-90s.

119 Q:

And each of those you were testifying -- part of your testimony had to do with deriving motive from analysis of the crime scene and/or autopsy photos?

120 A:

Yes.

121 Q:

Now, the other opinion you mentioned, opinion you said, assuming Mr. Simpson is the perpetrator, trying to determine a likely motive that he would have had; is that right?

122 A:

Yes.

123 Q:

And how did you -- what method did you use, or what did you do to arrive at that opinion?

124 A:

To the information that I already had from the crime scene and autopsy information, I then added information specific to Mr. Simpson, which included portions of his testimony; his prior statements; his writings; Nicole Simpson's writings, including her diary; statements that were transcribed -- that is, transcripts of statements made by witnesses; some transcribed trial testimony; a 911 tape; and a surreptitiously made recording known as the Lally tape; a transcript of the conversation during the so-called slow-speed chase between Mr. Simpson and the law enforcement.

125 Q:

Are those kinds of materials the kinds of materials that are typically relied upon by forensic psychiatrists in assessing motive?

126 A:

Yes.

127 Q:

Is there a body of scientific literature regarding motives for homicide?

128 A:

Yes, there is.

129 Q:

Are you familiar with that body of knowledge?

130 A:

Yes, I am.

131 Q:

Is that something you keep abreast of in your work?

132 A:

Yes, reasonably well.

133 Q:

Okay. And have you been qualified as an expert to testify in other cases about a particular motive, that is likely to be the defendant's defense in the case, had for committing the crime for which he's on trial?

134 MR. LEONARD:

Objection. Not relevant as phrased.

135 THE COURT:

Overruled.

136 DR. PARK DIETZ:

Yes, I have.

137 Q:

(BY MR. GELBLUM) Can you give us a few examples?

138 A:

I think all the cases that I just listed would be examples of that.

139 Q:

You did -- you rendered both kinds of opinions in those cases? In other words, an opinion that wasn't specific to the person on trial, as well as an opinion it was specific to the motive of that person?

140 A:

Well, they'd be opinions that were derived from both.

141 Q:

Both from the crime scene and from the other information you just described?

142 A:

Yes. I think of the cases I specifically mentioned, all have a known offender.

Now, there are other instances where I testified as to motive, where the offender was unknown. But I don't think I listed any by name.

143 Q:

Okay. And is the method -- are the methods that you used in arriving at these two opinions, methods that are generally accepted in the field of forensic psychiatry?

144 A:

I think "method" may put it too strongly, but this approach is generally accepted and is routinely done throughout the field.

145 Q:

How do you know that?

146 A:

Because I'm in touch often with colleagues. I'm the immediate past president of our national academy. And so I do have a good sense, I think, of what others are doing.

147 MR. GELBLUM:

I have nothing further, Your Honor.

148 THE COURT:

Cross.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. LEONARD:

149 Q:

Nice to see you again.

150 A:

Hello.

151 Q:

Let me make sure I understand your testimony completely. You testified that you that -- your testimony had been admitted in a number of cases -- and correct me if I'm wrong, involving motive for an offense, correct?

152 A:

Yes.

153 Q:

Your assessment of what the motive was, right?

154 A:

Yes.

155 Q:

And in each and every one of those cases the perpetrator was already known. In other words, there was an assumption that an individual had committed the crime, right?

156 A:

In each one that I listed by name, that's correct.

157 Q:

Yeah. You were testifying, for instance, in the -- when there was an insanity defense or diminished capacity defense raised, correct, in most of those cases?

158 A:

In most of those, that would be true also.

159 Q:

So, you weren't testifying as to whether or not a particular defendant was guilty based on your motive analysis, you were just trying to gauge the motive for purposes of determining whether the defendant had a diminished capacity. Is that defined under the various laws and also whether -- whether or not there was a legitimate insanity defense, correct?

160 A:

In all but one, that's correct. That one of the named -- one of the cases that I named earlier, the sole exception would be California_V.__Davis in which my testimony did go specifically to his guilt to one charged offense that he had denied committing.

161 Q:

And -- but there were a number of uncharged offenses that were involved in that case, correct or not? Correct me if I'm wrong.

162 A:

Would you repeat the question?

163 Q:

Were there a number of uncharged offenses that were at issue in that case, in the Klaas case, Polly Klaas case?

164 A:

I don't know what you mean by an uncharged offense being at issue.

165 Q:

In that case, you had actually had some access to medical records of the defendant, correct?

166 A:

Many kinds of records of the defendant, including medical.

167 Q:

Including medical records, right?

And you had -- you had had actually access to some evaluations that had been done of the defendant by other psychologists or psychiatrists, correct?

168 A:

Yes.

169 Q:

Okay. Now, let me see if I can understand how you compartmentalized your opinions in this case. Let's focus on the crime scene analysis.

What you've done, essentially, and you use the word "profiling" several times, and I think I know what that means, but as I understand it, what you do is that you look at crime scene photographs. You look at the autopsy protocol and then you determine whether or not that what you see in this information fits the pattern or profile that you would expect to see in a certain kind of crime; that is, a certain homicide that was motivated by a certain mental state of the defendant, correct?

170 A:

Not exactly, no.

171 Q:

But in this case you, in fact, looked at the crime classification manual, correct?

172 A:

That is one thing I did, yes.

173 Q:

You tried to determine whether the pattern that had been developed by the behavioral science unit at the FBI was the facts, as you understood them, fit into the pattern, correct?

174 A:

Having reached an opinion, based on my own analysis, I then turned to the manual and found that there was a correspondence between my analysis of this case and their descriptions of a spontaneous domestic homicide.

KEY QUOTE
175 Q:

And that's the kind of thing, for instance, that the behavioral science unit did in the Richard Jewell case; is that right?

176 A:

No, I don't think so. I think they were doing something different there.

177 Q:

They did a profile based on what they knew about the incident, the bombing incident, correct?

178 A:

I don't know what they originally did, and I'm unfortunately, not able to discuss my current role in that case.

179 Q:

Okay. You, in your testimony, and during your deposition, you indicated that you had looked at crime classification manual, right; and you had also thought about your own experience and your own -- The information you had about various kinds of homicides and you decided that this homicide fit a certain pattern, right?

180 A:

"You decided?"

181 Q:

You decided it looked like a spousal homicide to you; is that right?

182 A:

Based on my review of the autopsy information and the crime scenes, I reached certain opinions about this crime. I then later turned to the manual and found a correspondence between my own findings and their description of spousal homicide, that's correct.

183 Q:

Okay. Of course, it wasn't a perfect fit, was it? In other words, the factors that were indicated in the crime classification manual, you didn't find all of those with regard to spousal homicide, did you?

184 MR. GELBLUM:

Objection. Irrelevant.

185 THE COURT:

Overruled.

186 DR. PARK DIETZ:

No. That's why this isn't an undertaking of trying to look for a one-size-fits-all pattern.

187 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Okay.

188 A:

Instead, it's an analysis of a particular crime.

189 Q:

Tell me, how can the judge, how can a jury, how could I, in cross-examining you possibly test the accuracy of your opinion? What could I look to? Tell me.

KEY QUOTE
190 A:

Well, the first thing you could do is test the logic of what I have to say about the relationship between the scene or the injuries and my conclusions.

You can probe whether they seem unreasonable. You can confront me with evidence that seems to contradict what I've said. You can show me how I've relied on incorrect information.

In other words, you can do the things that cross examiners always do with expert witnesses; and in addition, you could point out information that shows that I'm wrong, and that this crime wasn't a domestic homicide; that it was committed by someone else.

191 Q:

Okay. But there is no -- when you sat down and you decided that you could render an opinion in this case, you had a pattern in mind, correct? It was in your mind. It was in the crime classification manual, right?

192 A:

I think you misapprehend the pattern issue. When I sat down and looked at this case, I was looking at a crime scene that had a lot of information in it.

And my original opinions come from looking at that scene and what it has to say.

Just as I think any experienced investigator would look at that scene and reach largely, similar opinions. Those opinions don't purport to prove who did it and it would be an inappropriate use of that kind of analysis, to say this who did it.

193 Q:

Thank you, Doctor.

Now, you would agree with me that this type of profiling you're talking about or discerning appearance, that has no place in a court of law in determining whether or not a defendant is guilty or innocent, would you agree with that, sir?

194 A:

I don't think that's for me to say. I think that's for the Court to decide.

195 Q:

Isn't that what you just said?

196 A:

I think I just said that this kind of analysis does not purport to prove who, in fact, committed this crime.

197 Q:

Okay?

198 A:

I think evidence is admitted throughout criminal trials that does not in and of itself, taken alone, prove who committed this particular crime. And the same thing is true in a civil suit such as this in which no one piece of evidence may prove who committed this particular crime.

199 Q:

As a matter of fact, if I asked you, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, whether you can sit in front of this jury and tell them that Mr. Simpson committed the crime, your answer is no; isn't that right?

200 MR. GELBLUM:

Objection. Irrelevant.

201 THE COURT:

Overruled.

202 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Isn't that right?

203 A:

My answer is even more helpful to you --

204 Q:

Thank you.

205 A:

I would say I wouldn't answer that question because that's not my role.

206 Q:

It would be unethical, wouldn't it?

207 A:

I think it's so far beyond the pail that it would be out of the question.

208 Q:

Now, you also are of the opinion that based on everything you know about the preoffense behavior of Mr. Simpson, that if you had to bet, you would bet that he didn't commit the murder. Didn't you say that in your deposition?

209 MR. GELBLUM:

Objection. Irrelevant. This isn't cross-examination on his deposition. We're here to determine the Kelly Frye issues, not the test of validity.

210 THE COURT:

I assume you're going to be offering this witness for the objective of proving your case.

211 MR. GELBLUM:

Of course.

212 THE COURT:

And I think reasonable cross-examination would encompass this witness's opinion in that regard at that point.

This being a 402 hearing, overruled.

213 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) You remember testifying to that in your deposition?

214 A:

That's a mischaracterization. I'll tell you what I did testify to that you're misrepresenting. I testified that if the information available prior to these homicides concerning an abusive relationship were addressed for the purpose of prediction that one could safely bet that Mr. Simpson would continue to abuse Ms. Simpson. But one could not safely bet that Mr. Simpson would eventually, some day, kill Ms. Simpson.

215 Q:

And by the way, when you were at your -- Have you done anything since your deposition? You review any materials, got any additional information?

216 MR. GELBLUM:

Your Honor this is not a discovery tool here, Your Honor.

217 MR. LEONARD:

It's a foundational question.

218 THE COURT:

Okay. I'll strike it if it isn't.

219 DR. PARK DIETZ:

Not about this case.

220 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) What case did you think I was asking about?

221 MR. GELBLUM:

Your Honor, objection. Argumentative.

222 THE COURT:

Sustained.

223 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Isn't it true that at your deposition, that you had very little knowledge at all about the prior history of Mr. Simpson and Nicole Brown Simpson; isn't that true?

224 A:

I think that's true.

225 Q:

And you were willing to opine that point, that Mr. Simpson was the kind of person to commit this crime; isn't that right?

Do you remember saying that?

226 A:

Actually what I repeatedly said was that my testimony about preoffense behavior would go to the point that there is nothing about Mr. Simpson's preoffense behavior that would exclude him as the kind of person who would commit this crime.

227 Q:

Oh, okay.

So what you're saying is that you can't say that he did it, but you can say that -- you can't say that he didn't do it, right?

Is that what you're saying?

228 A:

What I'm saying is that I would not presume to say that he did it. I would, however, be prepared to say that as to rebut any suggestion that he's the kind of person who wouldn't have or couldn't have done it.

229 Q:

Let me read you from page 77 of your deposition.

230 MR. PETROCELLI:

What line?

231 MR. LEONARD:

Line 11.

232 MR. PETROCELLI:

One second.

233 (Pause for Plaintiff's Counsel to read.)
234 MR. PETROCELLI:

Okay.

235 MR. LEONARD:

The question is (reading):.

"Okay.

"What I mean when I say that this preoffense behavior is such as to make him the prime suspect in the eyes of an experienced investigator, I mean to say that from behavior of him and characteristics of him there for the offense that are highly suggestive, that's exactly the kind of person who would do such a thing."

236 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Do you remember testifying to that in your deposition, sir?

237 A:

Yes.

238 Q:

That's the basis to what you intend to elicit. That's what you intend to tell this jury, correct? That's what you'd like the jury to note at the end of your testimony?

239 MR. GELBLUM:

Irrelevant what this witness wants this jury to know.

240 THE COURT:

You may rephrase it.

241 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Isn't that what you're trying to impart to this jury, that Mr. Simpson is the kind of person that would commit this crime?

242 A:

Not me, no.

243 Q:

That's what you said in your deposition, didn't you?

244 MR. GELBLUM:

Your Honor, it's a deposition. It's irrelevant.

Your Honor, may I be heard on this to the extent that this --

245 THE COURT:

This a 402 hearing.

246 MR. GELBLUM:

That's exactly what I was going to say, Your Honor.

247 THE COURT:

Overruled.

Go ahead.

248 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Did you or did you not say that?

249 A:

I said that in my deposition in response to whatever this line of questioning was.

But I did not say that that's an opinion that I intend to offer at trial. And I, of course, do not have anything in particular that I care to tell this jury about. I'm responding to questions as they're asked.

And my understanding of what you've been asked in this respect about pretense behavior is to be able to rebut any suggestion that Mr. Simpson couldn't have done it 'cause he's not the kind of person who would.

250 Q:

So I just wanted to make that clear for the Court that that's what your -- that's what your intent here is, right?

251 MR. GELBLUM:

Objection. Asked and answered.

252 THE COURT:

Sustained.

253 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Let me ask you something. I found this curious in your deposition.

When you -- when you're attempting to testify as to the behavioral reconstruction, if you will, that is not just the -- not just the information that's contained in the autopsy reports and the photographs? You're relying on what you called -- what is -- what's another phrase you used? I haven't heard that before, "indirect behavioral assessment."

In other words, you're relying on what third parties have said about Mr. Simpson or what they've said about Nicole Brown Simpson; is that right? That's part of what you rely on?

254 A:

All sources of information other than what the defendant himself says are indirect.

255 Q:

Yeah. Yeah. You wouldn't want to rely on the defendant, right?

256 MR. GELBLUM:

Your Honor, he testified. He read the defendant's deposition.

257 THE COURT:

This is getting a little argumentative. You know there's no jury here.

258 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) You -- obviously you didn't interview Mr. Simpson, right?

259 A:

No, I haven't had that opportunity.

260 Q:

Did you ask these attorneys if they could petition the Court for an independent medical report?

261 THE COURT:

Sustained.

262 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Did you -- did you -- did you look at any standardized tests or have any standardized tests administered to Mr. Simpson?

263 A:

No. That isn't available to me either.

264 Q:

Now, when you get this information that comes from third parties, you know, statements or things they've said to the police or things they've said to other third parties, how do you decide what to believe and what not to believe?

265 A:

Well, I start by believing photographs and what I can see with my own eyes.

266 Q:

I'll make the question very clear. I'm not talking about photographs. I'm talking about information that you receive from third parties' statements and so forth which you're relying on in rendering your opinion in this case, right?

Tell me what -- how would you assess the veracity of those kind of statements?

267 A:

The same way anyone else does. That is by judging their internal plausibility, by judging their consistencies with other information, by judging whether they fit the other facts as they're known. By learning whether the individuals have been discredited or have had their reliability called into account in exactly the same way the fact-finder does.

268 Q:

Isn't that what the jury's supposed to do in a trial?

269 A:

Absolutely.

270 Q:

That's not your job, is it?

271 A:

Well, it's also necessary in order to draw any opinions to be able to look at what the facts seem to be and all facts are in play in the midst of a legal dispute.

My role is different from that of perhaps fact witnesses in that I'm required to be fair in my analysis of what to rely upon and by my view that I'm ethically bound to disclose when I'm aware that there is an unreliable source of information. Whereas fact witnesses don't have to worry themselves about those things.

272 Q:

How much you normally bill an hour?

273 MR. GELBLUM:

Objection. Relevance.

274 THE COURT:

Overruled.

275 DR. PARK DIETZ:

My customary private fee is $600 an hour. My government fee is $400 an hour and it's the latter that I'm charging on this case.

276 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) Okay. No further questions.

277 MR. GELBLUM:

Just a couple, Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. GELBLUM:

278 Q:

Dr. Dietz, you testified in cases other than the Davis case, as to motive or the issue was whether a person had committed a crime as opposed to an insanity issue?

279 A:

Yes.

280 Q:

All right. You -- do you know how many other cases -- about how many other cases?

281 A:

There are three that I can point to specifically. I don't know how many additional ones there may also be.

282 Q:

Okay. Do you know the names of those three?

283 A:

I know the name of two. Vance_versus_ Krause which was a civil case in Georgia known as the civil murder trial, in which a man denied having killed his wife. But I was plaintiffs' expert in a case designed to prove that he had killed his wife so that he wouldn't receive the life insurance benefits from his murder.

And a second case that I can recall by the name South Carolina versus Register. There was no mental defense raised and my recollection is that it was based on crime scene and other indirect evidence of his behavior that I testified as to the motive of the offender.

I don't recall too much detail about it. And then the third case that I can recollect was an Ohio case in which a man was involved in the asphyxia death of a woman he knew and I don't remember too much about it.

But it was based on crime scene evidence and other indirect evidence that I testified.

284 Q:

You ever testified in premise liability cases?

285 A:

Oh, yes. Well, I do that often. In many of those involved exactly the issue of looking at a crime scene and talking about the behavioral reconstruction of the offense and the motivation of the offender who may well be unknown.

286 Q:

And approximately how many times have you done that?

287 A:

I don't have a list of all those along, but I would imagine it's possibly been, oh, I'd say a dozen or more in the last two or three years where I've testified at a deposition about those issues and a few of them have come to trial.

288 Q:

A few of them have come to trial?

289 A:

Yes.

290 Q:

And finally, Doctor, can you describe just briefly and generally what you testified to in the Richard Davis case on this subject of motive and identity?

291 A:

In that case, the defendant had denied having committed lewd acts against Polly Klaas which was one of the charged offenses. And there were three crime scenes. The Klaas residence, from which she had been abducted; a location on a hillside, where she was held for a time while he got his car out of a ditch; and a third location where her body was recovered.

And each of those crime scenes revealed evidence related to the motivation of the offender.

For example, at the residence where Polly and her friends were first approached by the offender, were found precut length of a lingerie-like fabric that Davis had brought with him and had used to restrain the three girls. The fact that he used lingerie fabric, that he had precut it and brought with him a knife to the scene indicated that he'd fantasized in advance about his crime and had intended to restrain victims.

At the second -- oh, and he took with him from that scene tights and a nightgown that he later put on Polly.

At the second scene, at the hillside, there was evidence of a clearing in the woods. Davis had been seen there by witnesses with brush residue on, like, leaves and pine, pine needles. There was a condom wrapper of a brand that's unusual but to which Davis was known to have access.

And at the third location, where her body was found, although she was in an advanced state of decomposition, there was additional evidence suggestive of sexual assault in that her nightgown was inverted in a manner inconsistent with her having been dragged and thereby having the nightgown removed because it was symmetrical.

292 Q:

What conclusions did you come to and testify to on the basis of your analysis of the physical evidence?

293 A:

On the basis of that and more --

294 Q:

Right?

295 A:

-- I was able to conclude that Davis had, in fact, intended to commit a sex offense against Polly Klaas and had, in fact, engaged in lewd acts with her.

296 Q:

And you were permitted by the Court to testify to that subject?

297 MR. LEONARD:

Objection.

298 THE COURT:

Overruled.

299 MR. LEONARD:

Lack of foundation.

300 THE COURT:

He testified or he didn't.

301 Q:

(BY MR. GELBLUM) Did you testify to those conclusions in court?

302 A:

I testified about it being a sexually motivated offense and about his desire to control a helpless, suffering victim.

303 Q:

Thank you, Doctor.

304 MR. LEONARD:

Your Honor, couple more.

305 THE COURT:

Go ahead.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION. BY MR. LEONARD:

306 Q:

(BY MR. LEONARD) In the Davis case, it was assumed and known who the offender was, correct?

307 A:

He had confessed to the murder.

308 Q:

Right.

309 A:

But not the sex.

310 Q:

At issue was whether or not he had committed sexual acts in the course of the murder, correct?

311 A:

That was the issue for me, yes.

312 Q:

It had nothing to do with whether or not he was the person who committed the murder. He was -- he already confessed and was identified, right?

313 A:

Yes.

314 Q:

And was your testimony challenged in that case in any way, if you know?

315 A:

Yes. There was a hearing prior to the -- to the trial that had to do with what language I would be permitted to use.

316 Q:

Oh, okay. Thanks. Nothing further.

317 MR. GELBLUM:

Nothing.

318 THE COURT:

You may step down.

Temperature

tense

Key Quotes (5)

Park Dietz
Having reached an opinion, based on my own analysis, I then turned to the manual and found that there was a correspondence between my analysis of this case and their descriptions of a spontaneous domestic homicide.
Describes his methodology: formed opinion independently, then validated against the FBI Crime Classification Manual — not the other way around.
Dan Leonard
Tell me, how can the judge, how can a jury, how could I, in cross-examining you possibly test the accuracy of your opinion? What could I look to? Tell me.
Core Kelly-Frye challenge: attacking the scientific testability and falsifiability of behavioral profiling as expert testimony.
Park Dietz
I would not presume to say that he did it. I would, however, be prepared to say that as to rebut any suggestion that he's the kind of person who wouldn't have or couldn't have done it.
Dietz carefully frames his opinion's limited purpose — rebuttal of impossibility claims — rather than affirmative guilt.
Park Dietz
I testified that if the information available prior to these homicides concerning an abusive relationship were addressed for the purpose of prediction that one could safely bet that Mr. Simpson would continue to abuse Ms. Simpson. But one could not safely bet that Mr. Simpson would eventually, some day, kill Ms. Simpson.
Corrects Leonard's mischaracterization of his deposition; distinguishes between predicting continued abuse versus predicting homicide.
Dan Leonard
from behavior of him and characteristics of him there for the offense that are highly suggestive, that's exactly the kind of person who would do such a thing.
Leonard reads from Dietz's deposition to show the jury-facing implication of his testimony despite Dietz's careful hedging at the hearing.

Evidence (9)

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 (402 hearing)
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Park Dietz, dated October 1995
Marked for identification and authenticated
Informal
FBI Crime Classification Manual — used to cross-check Dietz's independent crime-scene findings against the category of 'spontaneous domestic homicide'
Discussed
Informal
Crime scene photographs and diagrams from the Bundy Drive murders
Relied upon by Dietz in forming opinion
Informal
Autopsy photographs and protocols for Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman
Relied upon by Dietz in forming opinion
Informal
Nicole Simpson's diary
Reviewed by Dietz as part of Simpson-specific behavioral analysis
Informal
911 tape
Reviewed by Dietz
+ 3 more

Notable Exchanges (4)

Dan LeonardPark Dietz
Leonard pressed Dietz on whether his profiling methodology is scientifically testable. Dietz responded that cross-examiners can probe the logic, confront contradictory evidence, and challenge reliance on inaccurate information — essentially that it is tested the same way any expert opinion is.
strategic
Dan LeonardPark Dietz
Leonard used Dietz's deposition to suggest Dietz believed Simpson was a 'prime suspect' based on preoffense behavior, which Dietz distinguished from saying Simpson committed the crime. Dietz clarified his role as rebuttal to claims Simpson couldn't have done it.
revealing
Dan LeonardPark Dietz
Leonard asked whether Dietz would testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Simpson committed the crime. Dietz replied: 'I would say I wouldn't answer that question because that's not my role.'
strategic
Dan LeonardPark Dietz
Leonard challenged whether the pattern-matching approach Dietz used was like the FBI's Richard Jewell profiling, implying it led to wrongful targeting. Dietz deflected, saying they were doing something different and he couldn't discuss his current role in that case.
pointed

Light Moments (1)

Park Dietz
Laughter in court when Dietz said 'I wouldn't want to characterize them as leading, but I should mention two of my own' when asked for notable publications in the field.

Credibility Attacks (3)

⚔ Park Dietz
Prior inconsistent statement / deposition impeachment
Leonard read from Dietz's deposition (p. 77, line 11) in which Dietz called Simpson 'exactly the kind of person who would do such a thing,' attempting to show Dietz's testimony was really a guilt opinion dressed up in methodological language.
⚔ Park Dietz
Methodological challenge (Kelly-Frye)
Leonard argued that crime-scene profiling is untestable, has no falsifiable standard, and that the pattern-matching Dietz described ('spontaneous domestic homicide') was not a perfect fit — directly challenging admissibility of the methodology.
⚔ Park Dietz
Scope of knowledge challenge
Leonard elicited that at the time of his deposition, Dietz had very little knowledge of the prior history between OJ and Nicole Simpson, yet was willing to opine about preoffense behavior.

Witness Demeanor

(Laughter) — after Dietz self-deprecatingly cited his own publications
(Pause for Plaintiff's Counsel to read) — before Leonard read deposition excerpt

Objections

12 objections (3 sustained, 9 overruled)
Proceeding 8195 • 318 utterances • Plaintiff witness
Civil Trial
Department 103
⚖️ Start
📂 NOV 7, 1996 📄 Direct examination of Dr. Park
NOV 7, 1996 KRT DvH TD